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Perceiving Orientation: Defining Sexuality After Obergefell 
MARY ZIEGLER* 
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
constitutional jurisprudence will have to more clearly define sexual orientation itself. The 
Obergefell majority describes sexuality as binary and suggests that any sexual 
orientation is immutable, normal, and constitutive of individual identity. Other scholars 
have shown how the kind of binary created by Obergefell excludes those with more fluid 
sexual identities and experiences from legal protection. 
This Article illuminates new problems with Obergefell’s approach to sexuality by 
putting that definition in historical context. While describing sexuality as a matter of 
orientation may now seem inevitable, this Article shows that nothing could be further 
from the truth. In the 1970s, leading GLBTQ activists considered and rejected the 
language of sexual orientation. Instead, movement members battled for civil-rights laws 
banning discrimination on the basis of sexual or affectional preference. 
The rhetoric of preference gained support for reasons that remain relevant to sexual-
orientation jurisprudence today. Drawing on the history of debates about sexual 
orientation, this Article proposes a definition that protects individuals on the basis of 
actual or perceived sexual orientation. A perceived-orientation approach addresses 
problems mentioned in leading studies as well as those spotlighted by activists in over 
time. First, this strategy will make it harder for discriminators to separate conduct and 
status. This approach also protects those who do not fit within established heterosexual or 
homosexual categories, but does not depend for its success on the rejection of those 
entrenched binaries. Perhaps most importantly, a perceived-orientation approach 
promises relief to all victims of orientation-based stereotyping, not only to those who can 
prove their “true” status. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges,1 the future of sexual-orientation jurisprudence seems open.2 As the 
courts come closer to outlawing sexual-orientation discrimination, constitutional 
jurisprudence will have to more clearly define sexual orientation itself. The 
Obergefell majority describes sexuality as binary and suggests that sexual 
orientation is immutable, normal, and constitutive of individual identity.3 As 
scholars from Kenji Yoshino to Elizabeth Glazer have shown, the kind of binary 
definition of sexuality articulated by Obergefell promises to exclude those with 
more fluid sexual identities and experiences.4 
This Article illuminates new problems with Obergefell’s approach to 
sexuality by putting that definition in historical context. While describing 
sexuality as a matter of orientation may now seem inevitable, this Article shows 
that nothing could be further from the truth. In the 1970s, leading GLBTQ 
activists considered and rejected the language of sexual orientation.5 Instead, 
movement members battled for civil-rights laws banning discrimination on the 
basis of sexual or affectional preference.6 
The rhetoric of preference gained support for reasons that remain relevant 
to sexual-orientation jurisprudence today. Activists in the 1970s worried that 
orientation-based categories left open the door for conduct, rather than status--
 
 1.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2.  On the future of sexual-orientation discrimination litigation after Obergefell, see Timothy M. 
Phelps, Next frontier for gays is employment and housing discrimination, L.A. TIMES (June 26, 2015, 7:23 
AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-gays-employment-20150626-story.html; Lydia DePillis, 
This Is the Next Front in the Battle for Gay Rights, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/26/this-is-the-next-frontier-in-the-
battle-for-gay-rights/.  
 3.   See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (describing “sexual orientation [as] both a normal 
expression of human sexuality and immutable”). Part III infra further discusses Obergefell’s definition 
of sexuality. 
 4.  See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 997, 998–1026 (2012); Kenji 
Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000); RUTH COLKER, 
HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW 15–38 (1996) 
[hereinafter COLKER, HYBRID] (introducing a perspective that “reject[s] conventional bipolar 
categories in the areas of gender, race, and disability . . . ”); Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation, 
Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1–3 (1995) [hereinafter Colker, Bi]; Naomi 
Mezey, Dismantling the Wall: Bisexuality and the Possibilities of Sexual Identity Classification Based 
on Acts, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 98, 100–03 (1995).  
 5.  See infra Part I.  
 6.  See infra Part I. 
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based, discrimination.7 Laws protecting individuals on the basis of status did 
nothing to address cases involving either false positives—individuals wrongly 
believed to be gay or punished for gender nonconformity—or false negatives—
individuals who could not prove that a discriminator knew about their 
orientation.8 Orientation-based categories also threatened to leave out people 
who did not fit into the rigid categories defined by law.9 
Movement leaders ultimately embraced the orientation-based approach that 
is familiar to us because of new legal and political challenges. Confronting an 
energetic Religious Right and the AIDS epidemic, movement leaders in the 1980s 
recognized underappreciated costs associated with describing sexuality as a 
choice.10 At a time when many did not accept anything but heterosexuality as 
legitimate, describing sexuality as a choice undermined early calls for 
antidiscrimination protections and the repeal of sodomy bans.11 
Drawing on the history of debates about sexual orientation, this Article 
proposes a definition that protects individuals on the basis of actual or perceived 
sexual orientation—one that focuses not only on “true” orientation but on what a 
discriminator believes an individual to be. This strategy draws on disability 
jurisprudence under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits 
discrimination against those regarded as disabled.12 In a variety of doctrinal 
areas, including Title VII employment discrimination and equal-protection, a 
perceived-orientation approach would address some of the problems tackled by 
existing studies. First, orientation-based approaches do not explicitly address 
discrimination on the basis of conduct. A photographer refusing to cover a same-
sex ceremony could claim not to be discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation (orientation-based discrimination) but rather expressing discomfort 
with a same-sex couples’ decision to marry (conduct-based discrimination). 
However, conduct troubles discriminators partly because of what they believe it 
implies about the victim’s status. An approach that recognizes the relationship 
between conduct and perceived orientation will make it harder for 
discriminators to separate conduct and status. 
A perceived-orientation approach also promises a unique degree of 
protection to those who do not adhere strictly to the gay-straight binary. To 
protect these individuals, other scholars propose antidiscrimination laws that 
focus on conduct or that add new categories to cover anyone who falls 
somewhere between the gay-straight binary.13 A perceived-orientation strategy 
 
 7.  See infra Part I. 
 8.  See infra Part I. 
 9.  See infra Part II. 
 10.  See infra Part II. 
 11.  See infra Part II. 
 12.  On regarded-as theories, see, for example, John M. Vande Walle, Comment, In the Eye of the 
Beholder: Issues of Distributive and Corrective Justice in the ADA’s Employment Protection for Persons 
Regarded as Disabled, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 897, 897–905 (1998); Stephen F. Befort, Let’s Try This Again: 
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to Reinvigorate the “Regarded As” Prong of the Statutory 
Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993 (2010); Sarah J. Parrot, The ADA and Reasonable 
Accommodation of Employees Regarded as Disabled: Statutory Fact or Bizarre Fiction?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1495, 
1495–532 (2006).  
 13.  See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 4, at 998–1026; Yoshino, supra note 4, at 353–80; COLKER, HYBRID, 
supra note 4, at 15–38. 
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may work better than these alternatives. In simply creating new orientation 
categories, the law almost inevitably replicates the problem created by the gay-
straight binary, leaving out those who do not clearly belong to any of the existing 
categories. However, it would be hard to convince courts to reject categories 
altogether, particularly given the resonance of a gay-straight binary. A 
perceived-orientation strategy avoids both of these problems. 
Finally, a perceived-orientation approach addresses the harms tied to 
sexual-orientation stereotyping. Strategies focused on “true” conduct or identity 
neglect victims targeted for acting queer or violating expected gender norms. By 
addressing orientation stereotyping, laws reaching perceived orientation would 
offer more robust protection. Moreover, such an approach recognizes that 
stigmatizing outsider communities damages not just GLBTQ Americans but also 
anyone whose conduct defies standard expectations about sex, gender, and 
sexuality. 
The argument for a perceived-identity approach proceeds in four parts. Part 
I begins tracing the history of debates about the framing of sexuality. This Part 
explores the problems activists working in the 1970s identified with the language 
of sexual orientation. Part II examines the reasons for the decline of the language 
of “sexual or affectional preference.”  Part III uses this history to analyze the 
definitions of sexuality at work in the Obergefell majority, as well as in the 
dissents of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia. Part IV evaluates Obergefell’s 
definition of sexuality against leading scholarly proposals redefining sexuality. 
This Part proposes a perception-based alternative, and Part V concludes. 
I. PREFERENCE OR ORIENTATION: THE HISTORY OF FRAMING SEXUALITY 
After the 1969 Stonewall riots, the early GLBTQ movement began 
developing a reform agenda.14 Members of some organizations, like the Gay 
Liberation Front (GLF), urged their colleagues to fight for revolution alongside 
other New Left groups, including those advocating for Black Power and 
women’s rights.15 Other groups, like the Gay Activists Alliance (GAA), the Gay 
Rights National Lobby (GRNL), and the National Gay Task Force (later the 
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force/NGLTF), prioritized a pragmatic, law-
reform agenda.16 
 
 14.  On the history of the early movement, see, for example, ELIZABETH A. ARMSTRONG, FORGING 
GAY IDENTITIES: ORGANIZING SEXUALITY IN SAN FRANCISCO, 1950-1994, 70–100 (2002); DAVID CARTER, 
STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE GAY REVOLUTION 222–42 (2010); DUDLEY CLENDINEN & 
ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 
50–62, 83–84 (1999). 
 15.  For an example of GLF’s involvement with other New Left groups, see Will Lissner, New Left 
Groups in Session Here, N.Y. TIMES, July. 19, 1970, at 33. For more on the connection between GLF and 
the New Left, see JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 233 (2d ed., 1998); ANDREW 
HARTMAN, A WAR FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE CULTURE WARS 32–33 (2015).  
 16.  On the early history of GAA, see, for example, CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 
50–74; CHRISTINA B. HANHARDT, SAFE SPACE: GAY NEIGHBORHOOD HISTORY AND THE POLITICS OF 
VIOLENCE 89–90, 121–22 (2013). On the early history of GRNL, see, for example, TINA FETNER, HOW 
THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT SHAPED LESBIAN AND GAY ACTIVISM 48 (2008); CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, 
supra note 14, at 263–79. On the early history of NGLTF, see, for example, MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM 
THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 28–32 
(2012); CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 196–98. 
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Both movement radicals and reformers fought about how best to describe 
sexuality to an often-hostile public. GLF members contended, as member Allen 
Young put it, that “[g]ay . . .  means not homosexual, but sexually free.”17 By 
1969, former GLF members started the GAA as a splinter group that would 
prioritize antidiscrimination protections for gays and lesbians over a broad New 
Left agenda.18 Notwithstanding its more pragmatic stance, GAA also presented 
sexuality partly as a matter of choice.19 Members described a right to sexual 
freedom that would protect gays and lesbians: individuals’ “right to control [. . .] 
[their] bodies,” “to make love with anyone, anytime, anyway, provided only that 
such action be freely chosen.”20 
A. The Fight for the Nation’s First Civil Rights Ordinance Sparks Debate 
By 1971, when GAA leaders first campaigned for an antidiscrimination 
ordinance in New York City, debate about the proposed law forced members to 
more clearly explain sexuality to voters and politicians.21 As the GAA stated in a 
press release, the proposal, Int. No. 475, “would amend the omnibus Human 
Rights Law of New York City by adding the words ‘sexual orientation’ to all 
parts of the law which currently outlaw discrimination on the basis of ‘race, 
color, creed, national origin, ancestry, or physical handicap.’”22 The proposal did 
not entirely abandon the idea that sexuality was freely chosen.23  Indeed, Int. No. 
475 defined sexual orientation as “the choice of sexual partner according to 
gender.”24 
The GAA and its allies on the city council first focused on what seemed to 
be the easy issues. Supportive city council members argued that gays and 
lesbians already held positions all over the city.25 The threat of discrimination 
only made them vulnerable to blackmail.26 Soon, however, the bill stalled, and 
GAA members had to reconsider the definition of sexual orientation.27 Over 
time, it became clear that supporters of the bill seemed unwilling to protect either 
 
 17.  Allen Young, Out of the Closets, Into the Streets, in OUT OF THE CLOSETS: VOICES OF GAY 
LIBERATION 28 (Karla Jay & Allen Young eds., 1992). 
 18.  On the founding of GAA, see, for example, ARMSTRONG, supra note 14, at 87; MARC STEIN, 
RETHINKING THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT 100–10 (2012); SIMON HALL, AMERICAN PATRIOTISM, 
AMERICAN PROTEST: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SINCE THE SIXTIES 40 (2011). 
 19.  See Preamble to the Constitution and Bylaws of Gay Activists Alliance, Inc. (1971), in SPEAKING 
FOR OUR LIVES: HISTORIC SPEECHES AND RHETORIC FOR GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS (1892-2000) 148–50 
(Robert B. Ridinger ed., 2012). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  On the push for the civil-rights law in 1971, see, for example, FETNER, supra note 16, at 36; 
HALL, supra note 18, at 44; ROBERT O. SELF, ALL IN THE FAMILY: THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY SINCE THE 1960S 236–40 (2013). 
 22.  Pamphlet, Gay Activists Alliance, Civil Rights for Homosexuals (1971) (on file with author 
and in the Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript Library).   
 23.  Council Int. No. 475 (N.Y.C. 1971) (on file with author and the Columbia University Rare 
Book & Manuscript Library).   
 24.  Id.   
 25.  See, e.g., Eleanor Blau, Repeal of Laws on Sex Is Urged Here, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1971, at 29. 
 26.  See, e.g., id. 
 27.  On the stalling of the bill, see, for example, Edward Ranzal, Homosexuals Bill Protecting Rights 
Is Killed by Council, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1972, at 1. 
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public expressions of affection between gay and lesbian couples or gender 
nonconformity. Even sympathetic lawmakers seemed reluctant to protect 
“transvestites”—defined as those cross-dressing in public—particularly in 
situations in which they would interact with minors.28 In 1971, while debate 
about the civil-rights ordinance continued, New York removed a ban prohibiting 
gays and lesbians from working or congregating in cabarets.29 However, the bill 
retained a ban on any “transvestites” entering a cabaret for teenagers.30 
As the next several years would make clear, legislators’ persistent 
discomfort with “transsexuals” would raise hard questions about the language of 
sexual orientation. In January 1972, a committee killed the civil-rights bill, 
shocking GAA leaders.31 Some in the legislature blamed the defeat on disgust 
with the conduct of those who were openly gay. One lawmaker explained: 
“Those who were undecided found [activists’] behavior generally repugnant in 
flaunting their gay liberation instead of stressing their civil rights.”32 While some 
supporters of the bill favored protection for those with a private, hidden 
orientation, they could not stomach the equality demands of those who were 
open and unapologetic. 
Concern about the distinction between conduct and orientation raged on. In 
1972, when New York City Mayor John Lindsay acted to ban discrimination 
against GLBTQ workers in the civil service, he outlawed discrimination only on 
the basis of “private sexual orientation.”33 In 1973, when several state bar 
associations came out in favor of the bill, lawyers leading the groups insisted that 
many gays and lesbians did nothing in public that would offend anyone.34 As 
bar-association representatives explained: “Much of the resistance to legislation 
prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals stems from the belief that all 
homosexuals behave in a stereotype[d] fashion which is often identified with 
eccentric dress and conduct.”35 Protection against sexual orientation 
discrimination seemed likely to do little for gender nonconforming New Yorkers, 
GLBTQ radicals, and others whose conduct still offended even those supporting 
a civil-rights ordinance. 
The conduct-status distinction again took center stage when the civil rights 
law finally made it out of committee. “Soberly dressed” proponents of the bill 
focused on fairly abstract issues of equality.36 When opponents charged that the 
bill would put gays and lesbians in the city’s police force, fire department, and 
schools, proponents responded that gay teachers could do nothing to change 
 
 28.  For examples of the later fixation on “transsexuals,” see, for example, Alfonso A. Narvaez, 
City Acts to Let Homosexuals Meet and Work in Cabarets, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1972, at 35 (referring to 
them as “transvestites”); Edward Ranzal, Bar Groups Back Homosexual Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1973, at 
62 [hereinafter Ranzal, Bar Groups]; Edward Ranzal, Homosexual Bill Gains in Council, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
19, 1974, at 1 (referring to transsexuals as “transvestites”).  
 29.  See, e.g., Narvaez, supra note 28, at 35. 
 30.  See, e.g., id. 
 31.  See, e.g., Ranzal, supra note 27. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  New City Directive Bars Hiring Bias on Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1972, at 35.  
 34.  See Ranzal, Bar Groups, supra note 28, at 62. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Maurice Carroll, City Council’s Bill on Homosexual Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1974, at L70. 
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sexual orientation.37 Marc Rubin, an openly gay teacher, asserted: “Most 
authorities feel sexual orientation is imprinted by 3 years old and it is so deep 
that it is simply not touched by the school.”38 
Nevertheless, opponents used the distinction between private orientation 
and public conduct to defeat the bill. Whereas GLBTQ activists presented Intro 
475 as a modest civil-rights measure, Catholic leaders opposed to the bill argued 
that it would legitimize not only private sexual orientation but also public gay 
conduct.39 Catholic News, the mouthpiece of the state Catholic conference, 
charged that the bill would be “interpreted by many as public license to 
uninhibited manifestations of sexual preference.”40 The New York debate helped 
to establish orientation as shorthand for private status. While legislators might 
support protection for something that a person could not change, opponents of 
the bills insisted that the law should leave discrimination on the basis of conduct 
untouched.41 
When the New York bill failed again, activists across the country considered 
alternative definitions of sexuality. Early in 1973, one particularly influential 
effort unfolded in Minneapolis-St. Paul.42 Twenty prominent activists met with 
sympathetic mental health professionals and attorneys to develop a model civil-
rights ordinance.43 Some of those present “felt that words like ‘homosexual’ or 
‘sexual orientation’ ought to be used” because “‘everybody [knew] what they 
mean[t].’”44 Others worried that an orientation-based approach would inevitably 
leave many without protection.45 As one attendee explained: “Gay people get 
hassled not for what they do in bed, but for publicly expressing their affection—
holding hands, dancingor even for projecting an image which society does not 
usually associate with ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ roles.”46 
Ultimately, the attendees settled on a definition first proposed by clinical 
psychologist Gary Schoener who favored the language of “affectional or sexual 
preference.”47 Schoener argued that the language of sexual orientation wrongly 
suggested “that you can be put into one box based on your behavior.”48 While 
sexual orientation implied that relationships and identities were “static,” 
Schoener favored a definition that recognized the fluidity of relationships.49 
Attendees also approved of the language of sexual or affectional preference 
because it dignified the relationships of GLBTQ couples and highlighted the non-
 
 37.  See, e.g., Gene I. Maeroff, Homosexuals Declare Right to Teach, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1974, at 63. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See, e.g., id.; see also Maurice Carroll, Homosexual Bill Protest Draws Small Crowd Here, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 1, 1974, at 49. 
 40.  Carroll, supra note 36, at L70. 
 41.  See, e.g., id. 
 42.  See, e.g., Mailgram from Jack Baker, Chair Person, and Tom Higgins, President, The Gay 
Imperitive Inc. to Bella Abzug, U.S. Congresswoman (Sept. 26, 1974) [hereinafter Mailgram from 
Baker & Higgins] (on file with author and the Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript Library). 
 43.  See id. at 1. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  See id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
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sexual dimensions of those relationships.50 
Minnesota activists used the language of sexual or affectional preference in 
two radical ways. First, local advocates used preference language to mount the 
first major legal demand for marriage equality.51 In a pamphlet called A New Face 
for Love, Minnesota activists spotlighted committed same-sex marriage and 
demanded constitutional access to marriage.52 Jack Baker, a Minnesota attorney, 
later took the argument for marriage equality to court.53 Although the Minnesota 
Supreme Court rejected Baker’s argument in Baker v. Nelson and the U.S. 
Supreme Court dismissed Baker’s appeal for “want of a substantial federal 
question,” the Minnesota approach played a central role in efforts to dignify 
committed same-sex relationships.54 
The Minnesota strategy also explicitly recognized the fluidity of sexuality. 
“We all develop a certain capacity for caring for women and men—therefore, we 
all possess some degree of Gayness and Straightness,” A New Face for Love 
argued.55 “[T]hese two attributes do exist simultaneously.”56 The pamphlet 
argued that a preference-based approach would both recognize the fluidity of 
sexual attraction and require tolerance for public conduct.57 “The right to live as 
we desire includes the right to love out loud—we will no longer accept 
mistreatment for loving other people,” A New Face for Love explained.58 “The law 
must not sanction discrimination against any person on the basis of ‘affectional 
or sexual preference.’”59 
After prevailing in the Twin Cities, GLBTQ activists successfully pushed for 
city-level referenda in over nine other cities.60 Some cities, like Detroit, developed 
laws focused on sexual orientation.61 Other cities used sexual preference as an 
alternative framework.62 
With two models on offer, activists debated whether orientation and 
preference could be used interchangeably and whether one better served the 
movement’s goals. At the national level, the orientation-versus-preference debate 
defined the work of NGLTF, a group that worked heavily on civil-rights 
legislation. The issue of defining sexuality first came to the NGLTF’s attention in 
1973, when the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) voted to no longer 
 
 50.  See id. 
 51.  See, e.g., id. at 1–3; see also Memorandum, A New Face for Love 1–3 (c. 1972) [hereinafter A New 
Face for Love] (on file with author and in the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library). 
 52.  On Baker’s suit, see, for example, CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 56–57, 71–74; 
KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 18–19.  
 53.  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 54.  For the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision, see Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 
1971). For the Supreme Court’s appeal dismissal, see Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 55.  A New Face for Love, supra note 51, at 2. 
 56.  Id. at 2. 
 57.  See, e.g., id. 
 58.  Id. at 3. 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  See, e.g., Judith Cummings, Homosexual-Rights Laws Show Progress in Some Cities, but Drive 
Arouses Considerable Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1974, at 17. 
 61.  See, e.g., id. 
 62.  See, e.g., id. 
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treat homosexuality as a mental illness.63 NGTF hailed the step as “the greatest 
gay victory,” stating that “[t]he diagnosis of homosexuality as an illness has been 
the cornerstone of oppression of a tenth of our population.”64 
However, in the wake of the APA action, NGLTF members realized that 
simply opposing the mental-illness label would not be enough. If homosexuality 
was not a sickness, then what was it? Fights about this question had already 
begun in the psychiatric community. Therapists generally agreed that having a 
gay or lesbian orientation was at least sometimes “dysfunction[al]” but reached 
consensus on very little else.65 Led by researchers like Dr. Irving Bieber, an 
influential school of experts no longer categorized homosexuality as a mental 
illness, but argued that those unhappy with their sexual orientation could easily 
change it through therapy.66 In the early 1970s, even the generally sympathetic 
New York Times reported that 25 to 50 percent of gays and lesbians could become 
straight with proper treatment.67 
Other psychiatrists responded not only that sexual orientation was resistant 
to change but also that gays and lesbians had no reason to pursue a 
transformation.68 These experts argued that at least some gays and lesbians were 
healthy and well-adjusted.69 The outcome of this debate was far from clear. A 
New York Times headline captured this ambiguity: What We Don’t Know About 
Homosexuality; If it Isn’t an Illness, What Is It?70 
B. Movement Leaders Argue the Virtues of “Affectional or Sexual Preference” 
Initially, members of NGTLF disagreed about how best to answer that 
question. Believing that sexuality could not be changed, most of the 
organization’s male leaders favored the rhetoric of orientation.71 Women in 
NGLTF argued that preference language was more affirming, legitimizing the 
very conduct that New York legislators had found unacceptable.72 Ultimately, 
leaders of the group decided that preference language better served the 
movement’s goals for several reasons.73 
First, the language of preference seemed to make a cleaner break with 
 
 63.  On the APA’s new position, see, for example, Richard D. Lyons, Psychiatrists, in a Shift, 
Declare Homosexuality No Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1973, at 1; Peter Kihss, 8 Psychiatrists Are 
Seeking New Vote on Homosexuality as Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1974, at 39. 
 64.  Lyons, supra note 63, at 25.  
 65.  See, e.g., Robert E. Could, What we don’t know about homosexuality; If it isn’t an illness, what is 
it?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1973, at 213. 
 66.  For discussion of Bieber’s work, see, for example, id. and Jane E. Brody, More Homosexuals 
Aided to Become Heterosexual, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1971, at 1, 47. For a sample of Bieber’s work, see 
IRVING BIEBER, HOMOSEXUALITY: A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALS (1962).  
 67.  See Brody, supra note 66, at 1. 
 68.  For a summary of the work of those holding this view, see, for example, Could, supra note 
65. 
 69.  See, e.g., id.  
 70.  Id.  
 71.  See, e.g., CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 265–66; see also HEATHER MURRAY, NOT 
IN THIS FAMILY: GAYS AND THE MEANING OF KINSHIP IN POSTWAR NORTH AMERICA 64–65, 81–82, 107–
19, 179 (2012). 
 72.  See, e.g., CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 265–66. 
 73.  See, e.g., id. 
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arguments about dysfunction and mental illness still circulating in the 
psychiatric community. Avoiding stigma mattered particularly to lesbian 
feminists, many of whom had long used the language of sexual preference to 
fend off attacks by other members of the women’s liberation movement.74 In the 
early 1970s, when the National Organization for Women (NOW) first considered 
the issue of lesbian rights, veteran feminists like Betty Friedan opposed the 
idea.75 Friedan and her allies argued that the idea of lesbian rights would be used 
to discredit the entire women’s movement.76 
Feminists like Robin Morgan and Gloria Steinem responded that lesbian 
rights were central to all women’s liberation insofar as lesbians rejected the 
phallocentric, male-dominated hierarchy that had subordinated women.77 Using 
the language of preference allowed advocates like Morgan to present same-sex 
attraction as a legitimate, if not superior, alternative.78 As late as 1980, NOW 
defined lesbians as women who had a “primary psychological, emotional, social, 
and sexual preference for other women.”79 As lesbian feminists recognized, 
presenting sexuality as a matter of choice more directly challenged the stigma 
surrounding gay and lesbian sex. Rather than avoiding any discussion of the 
desirability of gay and lesbian relationships, the rhetoric of preference suggested 
that Americans could reasonably—and beneficially—choose same-sex 
relationships. 
Moreover, movement leaders believed that preference language promised 
broader protection than did the rhetoric of orientation. As the New York 
experience indicated, some lawmakers facing orientation bans still claimed the 
authority to discriminate on the basis of conduct.80 In other cities, the conduct-
orientation distinction posed a similar risk. In Ann Arbor, Michigan, when 
prosecutors pursued a lesbian couple observed dancing at a night club, local 
prosecutors denied that they discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation.81 
Assistant District Attorney Edward Pear explained: “It was our feeling that it 
was their conduct that was unacceptable.”82 
Sometimes, movement leaders also hoped that sexual-preference laws 
would protect those targeted because of gender non-conformity.83 In 1974, when 
 
 74.  On lesbian feminists’ use of the language of sexual preference, see, for example, MURRAY, 
supra note 71, at 81–82; WINIFRED BREINES, THE TROUBLE BETWEEN US: AN UNEASY HISTORY OF WHITE 
AND BLACK WOMEN IN THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT 104–105 (2006). For contemporary uses, see Judy 
Klemesrud, The Lesbian Issue and Women’s Lib, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1970, at 60; Robin Morgan, The 
Media and Male Chauvinism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1970, at 33. 
 75.  On the history of anti-lesbian rhetoric in NOW, see, for example, KARLA JAY, TALES OF THE 
LAVENDER MENACE: A MEMOIR OF LIBERATION 137–47 (2000); NANCY F. COTT, NO SMALL COURAGE: A 
HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 561 (2004); SARA EVANS, TIDAL WAVE: HOW WOMEN 
CHANGED AMERICA AT CENTURY’S END 51–52, 102, 122 (2010). 
 76.  See, e.g., id. at 51–52; COTT, supra note 75. 
 77.  See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 71, at 81–82. 
 78.  See, e.g., id. 
 79.  Pamphlet, Boston National Organization for Women, “Lesbians: A Consciousness-Raising 
Perspective” (1980) (on file with the author). 
 80.  See supra Part I. 
 81.  See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 60, at 17. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See, e.g., Madeleine Janover, Colorado Women, OFF OUR BACKS, May 31, 1974, at 12. 
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Boulder, Colorado, considered a civil-rights ordinance, a sociologist testifying in 
favor of the measure implied that the reform would help anyone targeted on the 
basis of orientation-based stereotyping.84 
NGLTF leaders promoted city ordinances as a way of building support for 
an amendment to the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 that would protect gays 
and lesbians.85 In 1974, Representative Bella Abzug (D-NY) introduced a bill 
amending Title VII to protect against discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual 
orientation, or marital status.86 Minnesota activists urged Abzug to change the 
bill to cover “sexual or affectional preference.”87 Jack Baker contacted Abzug and 
argued strongly for a preference-based approach, explaining: “The way [that the] 
media interprets legal semantics eventually shapes public attitude[s] and can go 
far in showing that gayness implies much more than sexual conduct.”88 “Please 
amend your bill to recognize that physical intimacy is only one albeit important 
part of human affections,” argued Michael McConnell, another Minnesota 
advocate.89 “Holding hands and other public expressions of [a]ffection costs 
more jobs than private sexual behavior.”90 
NGLTF leader Bruce Voeller travelled to Washington, DC to ask Abzug to 
change the bill’s language.91 Voeller “very strong[ly]” urged Abzug to frame 
sexuality as a matter of “affectional [or sexual] preference.”92 In explaining his 
reasoning, he emphasized that sexual-orientation protections left some without 
protection.93 He cited a case from Minneapolis-St. Paul in which police officers 
had harassed a couple for holding hands.94 Because these men were targeted 
because of their conduct, Voeller argued,  “under the phrase ‘sexual orientation’ 
it would not be clear that they would be protected from harassment.”95 The bill 
failed to make it out of committee, but Voeller and NGLTF asked that it be 
reintroduced in December.96 This time, the bill focused exclusively on sexual-
preference discrimination, but it fared no better in Congress.97 
 
 84.  See, e.g., id. 
 85.  See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 60, at 17. 
 86.  See, e.g., HANHARDT, supra note 16, at 165; SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, QUEERS IN COURT: GAY 
RIGHTS LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 215 (2007); JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 
319 (2009). 
 87.  See, e.g., Mailgram from Baker & Higgins, supra note 42; Mailgram from Michael McConnell 
to Bella Abzug, U.S. Congresswoman (Sep. 26, 1974) [hereinafter Mailgram from McConnell] (on file 
with author and the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library). 
 88.  Mailgram from Baker & Higgins, supra note 42. 
 89.  Mailgram from McConnell, supra note 87. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Marilyn to Bella Abzug, U.S. Congresswoman (Sep. 24, 1974) 
(on file with author and the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library) [hereinafter 
Memorandum from Marilyn].. 
 92.  Id. See also Memorandum from Jay to Bella Abzug, U.S. Congresswoman (Dec. 4, 1974) (on 
file with author and the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library).  
 93.  See Memorandum from Marilyn, supra note 91, at 1–2. 
 94.  See, e.g., id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See Memorandum, supra note 92, at 1–2. 
 97.  On Abzug’s reframing of the bill, see, for example, Letter from Bella Abzug, U.S. 
Congresswoman, to Stephen L. Rosenquist, Instructor in Classics, Sw. Mo. State Univ. (Feb. 6, 1975) 
(on file with author and the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library) (describing a 
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In spite of these setbacks, NGLTF continued describing sexuality as a matter 
of preference. In 1975, when the group invested more in litigation, a preference-
based strategy seemed to fit better with the substantive due process arguments 
stressed in court.98 Shortly after the Roe v. Wade decision, Bruce Voeller and gay-
rights attorneys met privately with Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas.99 
Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, invalidated the vast majority of 
abortion laws on the books, recognizing a right to privacy broad enough to cover 
a woman’s abortion decision.100 Activists took heart from Roe, and Douglas 
predicted that NGLTF could successfully challenge sodomy bans in the Supreme 
Court.101 NGLTF members soon took him up on the idea.102 In Doe v. 
Commonwealth’s Attorney, NGLTF worked with ACLU board member Philip 
Hirschkop, a prominent attorney known for his work on Loving v. Virginia,103 to 
organize a class action challenging Virginia’s sodomy ban, and Voeller’s lover 
served as one of the plaintiffs.104 On appeal, Hirschkop focused on arguments 
that the right to privacy recognized in Roe and its progeny protected the sexual 
behavior of consenting adults.105 At the same time, Marilyn Haft of the ACLU 
Sexual Privacy Project litigated her own challenge to sodomy bans in Enslin v. 
North Carolina.106 
 Although they lost in the lower courts, Hirschkop convinced one judge that 
the privacy right recognized in Roe extended to a “mature individual’s choice of 
an adult sexual partner.”107 When Hirschkop appealed, Haft also asked the Court 
to grant certiorari in Enslin, and NGTF filed an amicus curiae brief.108 However, 
the Court refused to hear Enslin and affirmed the lower court’s decision in Doe 
without issuing an opinion.109 NGLTF immediately issued a press release 
condemning the Court for “its insensitivity to the right to privacy of all 
Americans.”110 
 
preference-based bill as a “more effective mechanism” for protecting gay rights). On the failure of 
Abzug’s bill, see, for example, SEAN CAHILL & SARAH TOBIAS, POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER FAMILIES 45 (2007); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING 
THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 131 (2009). 
 98.  See supra Part I. 
 99.  See, e.g., JASON PIERCESON, COURTS, LIBERALISM, AND RIGHTS: GAY LAW AND POLITICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND CANDADA 71–72 (2005). 
 100.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150-51 (1973); Doe v. Bolton 410 U.S. 179 (1973).  
 101.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 105 
(2009). 
 102.  See, e.g., PIERCESON, supra note 99, at 71–72. 
 103.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Loving struck down anti-miscegenation laws. See id. 
 104.  See, e.g., PIERCESON, supra note 99. 
 105.  See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 
1861-2003 185–86 (2008); LEIGH ANN WHEELER, HOW SEX BECAME A CIVIL LIBERTY ix (2012). 
 106.  217 S.E. 2d 669 (N.C. 1975). On the litigation of Enslin, see, for example, ESKRIDGE, supra note 
105, at 187–90. 
 107.  Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203–05 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Mehrige J., 
dissenting). 
 108.  See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 105, at 185–86. 
 109.  For the Court’s decision, see Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney for  Richmond, 425 U.S. 985 
(1976). The Court denied certiorari in Enslin. See Enslin v. North Carolina, 425 U.S. 903 (1976).  
 110.  Robert D. McFadden, Homosexuals and A.C.L.U. Dismayed by Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
30, 1976, at 17. 
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Hoping for backlash to the Court’s ruling, Voeller and his co-director Jean 
O’Leary attacked Doe in the New York Times.111 They argued that by not 
protecting private sexual preferences, the Court threatened both straight and gay 
Americans.112 They asserted that previously, “the right to one’s own body and 
the right to the privacy of one’s own home have been vigorously protected by the 
Court.”113 According to Voeller and O’Leary, Doe “compromise[d] the Court’s 
earlier [privacy] decisions and should raise great fears.”114 
As the press release indicated, sexual-preference arguments continued to 
figure in NGLTF’s efforts to build allies outside of the GLBTQ community. 
O’Leary used similar reasoning in endorsing the decriminalization of 
prostitution.115 “When you talk about sex preference,” she explained, “you must 
include all women, prostitutes or lesbians.”116 NGLTF also presented sexuality as 
a matter of preference in 1976 when lobbying the Democratic Party for 
support.117 “Millions of women and men in this country are subject to severe 
social, economic, psychological, and legal oppression because of their sexual 
preference,” the platform proposal stated.118 “We affirm the right of all persons 
to define and express their own sensibility, emotionality, and sexuality and 
choose their own lifestyle, so long as they do not infringe upon the rights of 
others.”119 In 1977, when Representative Ed Koch (D-NY) again introduced a 
gay-rights amendment to Title VII, activists in the NGLTF and an allied 
organization, the Gay Rights National Lobby (GRNL), continued to depend on 
the language of “affectional or sexual preference.”120 
For much of the 1970s, leading GLBTQ reformers defined sexuality as a 
matter of preference rather than orientation. After some dispute, the leaders of 
state and national organizations promoted statutes that used a similar definition. 
Using the language of preference appealed to lesbians actively combatting the 
stigma surrounding same-sex attraction. As NGLTF members concluded, the 
rhetoric of preference seemed to offer more protection, because when cities 
prohibited sexual-orientation discrimination, public and private actors claimed 
the right to target GLBTQ individuals because of conduct or gender non-
conformity. 
In the later 1970s, however, leaders of groups like NGLTF began to question 
the wisdom of a preference-based definition. After the mobilization of the 
 
 111.  See Jean O'Leary and Bruce Voeller, Implications of the Supreme Court Decision on Sodomy, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 15, 1976, at 20. 
 112.  See id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  See, e.g., Lesbians Offer Support for Hookers, THE CHILDRESS INDEX, Nov. 22, 1976, at 5. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  See National Gay Task Force Recommendations for the 1976 Democratic Party Platform 
(1976) [hereinafter National Gay Task Force Recommendations] (on file with author and the 
Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library); see also Bruce Voeller, Exec. Dir., National 
Gay Task Force, to Bella Abzug, U.S. Congresswoman (May 3, 1976) (on file with author and the 
Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library).  
 118.  National Gay Task Force Recommendations, supra note 117, at 1. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See, e.g., Joe Totten to GRNL Board, Status of Gay Rights Legislation (Dec. 9, 1977) (on file 
with author and the Cornell University Library). 
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Religious Right,121 a loose coalition of organizations angry about recent legal and 
cultural changes involving gender roles, school prayer, and abortion, social 
conservatives coopted arguments that sexuality was a choice. In campaigning to 
defeat or repeal local civil-rights ordinances, activists argued that gays and 
lesbians needed behavior modification, not protection from discrimination. At 
the same time, anti-gay activists exploited arguments about the fluidity of 
sexuality. While repeating arguments conflating pedophilia and homosexuality, 
Religious Right leaders also insinuated that children close to gays and lesbians 
would change their sexual orientation. 
Facing a new challenge from the Right, activists in groups like NGLTF 
reconsidered the value of defining sexuality as a matter of choice. Over the 
course of the late 1970s, activists again began describing sexuality in terms of 
orientation. 
II. BACKLASH AND THE RISE OF AN ORIENTATION-BASED FRAMEWORK 
Religious Right leaders began exploiting preference-based definitions after a 
setback in Miami in 1977.122 After local leaders passed a civil-rights ordinance, 
Anita Bryant, a former beauty queen and gospel recording artist, founded a 
group dedicated to repealing the ordinance.123 Calling her group Save Our 
Children, Bryant implied that predatory gay men threatened families.124 Bryant 
and her allies first argued that civil-rights ordinances would simply allow gays 
to convert children to a deviant lifestyle.125 As Bryant told the New York Times in 
March 1977: “What these people really want [. . .] is the legal right to propose to 
our children that there is an acceptable alternative way of life—that being a 
homosexual or lesbian is not really wrong.”126 Bryant’s arguments appeared to 
 
 121.  First coined by the media, the term describes a loose coalition of socially conservative, 
generally (although not uniformly) Christian organizations that first took shape in the late 1970s to 
transform law and policy on issues including abortion, sex discrimination, school prayer, and gay 
rights. See, e.g., DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, GOD’S OWN PARTY: THE MAKING OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 160–
169 (2010) (explaining the origins of the term “religious right” and the coalition’s early work); J. 
BROOKS FLIPPEN, JIMMY CARTER, THE POLITICS OF THE FAMILY, AND THE RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT 
14–20 (2011) (describing debates about the definition of the Religious Right); David W. Moore, The 
“Religious Right”: Definition and Measurement, THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE, Apr.–May 1995, 
https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/public-perspective/ppscan/63/63011.pdf. 
 122.  See, e.g., CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 296; PHIL TIEMEYER, PLANE QUEER: 
LABOR, SEXUALITY, AND AIDS IN THE HISTORY OF MALE FLIGHT ATTENDANTS 131 (2013); WILLIAMS, 
supra note 121, at 109, 147–51. 
 123.  On the founding of Save Our Children, see, for example, MICHAEL STEWART FOLEY, FRONT 
PORCH POLITICS: THE FORGOTTEN HEYDAY OF AMERICAN ACTIVISM IN THE 1970S AND 1980S 88 (2013); 
CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS: THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 127 (2002); WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 109. 
 124.  See, e.g., FOLEY, supra note 123, at 88; RIMMERMAN, supra note 123, at 127; WILLIAMS, supra 
note 121, at 109. 
 125.  See, e.g., Anita Bryant Scores White House Talk with Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1977, at 
56; B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Miami Debate Over Rights of Homosexuals Directs Wide Attention to a 
National Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1977, at 18. 
 126.  Anita Bryant Scores White House Talk with Homosexuals, supra note 125, at 56. For more on the 
work of Save Our Children, see, for example, JANICE M. IRVINE, TALK ABOUT SEX: THE BATTLES OVER 
SEX EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 143 (2002); JEFFREY D. HOWISON, THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION: RONALD REAGAN AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 84 
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resonate; Miami residents voted against the ordinance by a two-to-one margin.127 
Pleased by the publicity Bryant brought to the issue of anti-GLBTQ 
discrimination, NGLTF and its allies publicly argued that Bryant was “the best 
thing that happened to gays.”128 To some extent, these arguments reflected the 
reality. For NGLTF, for example, the Bryant campaign apparently increased 
NGTF’s membership, fundraising, and volunteers by a factor of five.129 
Internally, however, NGLTF members worried that Bryant had exposed the 
weaknesses of the organization’s existing strategy.130 At a strategy meeting, 
NGLTF member Charles Brydon spoke up in favor of arguments based on 
preference and choice, suggesting that they connected the cause to policies 
favored by progressive movements.131 Brydon reminded those present that 
“abortion [was] also a choice.”132 Voeller initially agreed that a preference or 
choice-based strategy spoke to deeply-held American values, including the 
“strength of diversity.”133 
However, board members, Voeller among them, identified serious costs 
associated with describing sexuality as a matter of preference.134 At a minimum, 
Voeller suggested that NGTF “pull away from ‘right to choose’ [arguments] in 
the short term.”135 The Anita Bryant controversy had exposed some of the risks 
posed by a preference-based definition. If Bryant stoked fears about the spread of 
homosexuality, choice arguments could only exacerbate the problem.136 “‘Right 
of Choice’ is not a rallying point,” one board member reasoned. “People have a 
right to try to prevent children from being homosexual.”137 
As an emerging Religious Right and New Right coalition attacked other 
civil-rights ordinances, NGLTF leaders had more reason to question preference-
based arguments. 
Led by activists like Richard Viguerie and Paul Weyrich, the New Right 
mobilized conservatives angry at the Republican establishment.138 Weyrich and 
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135 (2005). For more on the motivations of major players in the New Right, see WILLIAMS, supra note 
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As New Right leaders sought to take out congressional liberals, activists like 
Viguerie and Weyrich identified issues like gay rights as a way of mobilizing 
previously disengaged conservative evangelical Protestants.140 Between 1978 and 
1979, prominent evangelicals founded organizations to advance their interests, 
including Christian Voice (1978) and the Moral Majority (1979).141 
Linking opposition to abortion and gay rights, leaders of the New Right and 
Religious Right described both as bad choice.142 During the fight for an Equal 
Rights Amendment (ERA) to the Constitution, Phyllis Schlafly, the most 
prominent opponent of the ERA, told her supporters that the amendment would 
entrench abortion and “give homosexuals all the rights of husbands and 
wives.”143 In either case, Schlafly claimed that ERA proponents used the 
language of a right to choose to camouflage their true desires.144 Choice was “the 
code word for abortion,” she alleged, “much as ‘different lifestyles’ [is] the code 
word for homosexuality.”145 
Using similar arguments, anti-gay leaders in the Religious Right and New 
Right expanded their campaign for the repeal of local civil-rights ordinances.146 
In St. Paul, Minnesota, Reverend Richard Angwin, a fundamentalist preacher 
from Kansas, headed the repeal campaign.147 Angwin used the idea of sexual 
preference to argue for repeal.148 “[B]eing a pervert is like being a thief,” Angwin 
explained.149 “[B]oth are wrong and both can continue or repent.”150 Angwin’s 
supporters carried the day. St. Paul voted to repeal its ordinance by a vote of 
54,046 to 31, 694.151 
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Religious Right groups mounted signature petition drives in Wichita, 
Kansas, and Eugene, Oregon.152 In both cities, local pastors argued that 
homosexuality was an illegitimate preference.153 Reverend Ron Adrian, the head 
of Concerned Citizens for Community Decency in Wichita, rejected the idea that 
the ordinance had anything to do with civil rights.154 “We think it’s an effort on 
the part of a small group of people to ask us to approve their immoral lifestyle,” 
Adrian asserted.155 Rosalie Butler, a sympathizer of the Religious Right and a 
member of the St. Paul City Council, backed Adrian’s assessment.156 “Those who 
choose a perverted lifestyle, whether it’s a homosexual [or] a robber, can’t expect 
the full rights [. . .] that people who live in step with society get,” she 
explained.157 
Arguments about immoral preferences apparently spoke to voters in 
Wichita and Eugene. On May 10, Reverend Adrian celebrated a huge margin of 
victory in Wichita, with voters repealing the city’s ordinance by a margin of 
29,402 to 6,153.158 Barely more than two weeks later, a partial tally in Eugene 
showed that 13,838 voters preferred repeal, with only 7,685 in opposition.159 In 
the wake of the defeats, the media described a bleak future for supporters of gay 
and lesbian rights. As the New York Times put it: “[I]t seems likely that few 
supporters of homosexual rights support them as vigorously as opponents 
oppose them.”160 
A. NGLTF Reconsiders Preference-Based Definitions 
Between 1978 and 1980, NGLTF leaders worried that preference-based 
definitions had done more harm than good, and organizational leaders began 
developing an alternative. Lesbian Tide, a movement publication, put out an 
article highlighting NGLTF’s use of an orientation-based definition.161 The article 
accused NGLTF of “calling for an end to choice.”162 Instead of refuting this 
charge, NGLTF leaders sent a letter “clarifying its position and [. . .] reiterating 
that sexual orientation and sexual preference are both useful terms to different 
segments of the community.”163 
 
 152.  See, e.g., Sheppard, Jr., supra note 147, at 27; see also Witchita Repeals Homosexual Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 1978, at A18; Grace Lichtenstein, Laws Aiding Homosexuals Face Rising Opposition 
Around Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1978, at A1. 
 153.  See infra Part II. 
 154.  See Witchita Repeals Homosexual Law, supra note 152. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  See Sheppard, Jr., supra note 147, at 27. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  See Witchita Repeals Homosexual Law, supra note 152. 
 159.  See, e.g., Wallace Turner, Voters in Eugene, Ore., Repeal Ordinance on Homosexual Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 24, 1978, at A18. 
 160.  Voters Reject Homosexual Rights But Why?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1978, at E16.  
 161.  See, e.g., NGLTF Board of Directors Meeting Minutes (Feb. 11-12, 1978), 14 (on file with 
author and the Cornell University Library). For the article, see Feminist, Gay Leaders Call for an End to 
‘Choice’? LESBIAN TIDE, Sep.-Oct. 1977, at 21. 
 162.  See supra note 158 and accompanying text.  
 163.  NGLTF Executive Committee Meeting Minutes (Jun. 1978) (on file with author and the 
Cornell University Library) [hereinafter June NGLTF Meeting Minutes]; NGLTF Executive 
Committee Meeting Minutes (Aug. 3, 1980) (on file with author and the Cornell University Library). 
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In part, the organization’s use of orientation rhetoric reflected fresh 
skepticism about trying to build common ground with liberal groups also 
challenging morals regulations.164 At a June NGLTF meeting discussing the 
referenda, movement leaders questioned whether liberals “were really with [the 
movement].”165 “The liberals’ support is not nearly as strong as many say it is,” 
one activist asserted.166 “As [. . .] the right wing’s power grows[,] panic will set 
in. The liberals will try to save themselves by remaining silent on issues that 
don’t affect them directly.”167 
In August 1978, the NGLTF Executive Committee again discussed “how to 
deal with the upcoming referenda and, in general, with the ‘new right wing.’”168 
Many present felt that potential progressive partners “did not want to deal with 
the gay issue, even though the groups battling gay rights were also battling other 
liberal causes”169 
Contemporary politics stoked these fears. The New York Times, the bible of 
many left-leaning groups, favored protections for gay and lesbian teachers only 
because there was no proof that they could change a child’s sexual orientation, 
explaining: “The desire for parents for reassurance that their children will not be 
somehow ‘converted’ to homosexuality at school is understandable.”170 In 1983, 
members of NOW and the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund publicly 
argued that “sexual preference should be protected by the right to privacy” but 
insisted that the ERA “would not legitimate same-sex marriages.”171 
As the AIDS epidemic hit the GLBTQ community, sexual-preference 
arguments became even more of a liability. Exploiting uncertainty about the 
transmission of the disease, anti-gay activists described AIDS as a disease 
resulting from a selfish lifestyle preference. In fighting for funding for AIDS 
research, confidentiality for AIDS victims, and antidiscrimination protections, 
GLBTQ activists responded that sexual orientation was not a preference and 
could not be changed. 
B. The AIDS Crisis Creates New Reason to Reframe Sexuality 
In 1981, the New York Times reported on a handful of cases of a rare illness 
that disproportionately affected gay men.172 Between 1982 and 1983, the number 
of patients with AIDS nearly tripled.173 Panic followed the spread of the disease. 
 
 164.  See June NGLTF Meeting Minutes, supra note 163, at 6. 
 165.  Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167.  Id. at 4. 
 168.  August NGLTF Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, supra note 163, at 4. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  The Homosexual in the Classroom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1977, at 28. 
 171.  Letter from Marsha Levick, Legal Director of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
to Staff (1983) (on file with author and the Harvard University Schlesinger Library). For a sample of 
similar arguments made by ERAmerica, see Homosexual Marriage: Not True, ERAMERICA NEWSLETTER 
(1978) (on file with University of Missouri-St. Louis); COMMON CAUSE, THE EQUAL RIGHTS 
AMENDMENT: A REPORT ON THE 27TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1979) (on file with 
University of Missouri-St. Louis). 
 172.  See, e.g., 2 Fatal Diseases Focus of Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1981, at 1. 
 173.  On the rapid spread of the disease, see, for example, AIDS: A New Disease’s Deadly Odyssey, 
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In 1983, the media ran stories suggesting that people infected with the disease 
could transmit it by casual contact.174 
The federal government responded slowly, forcing local GLBTQ groups to 
pick up the slack.175 Even when Congress appropriated money for AIDS research 
for the first time in 1983, President Reagan threatened to veto a bill that would 
have dedicated only $12 million for addressing the epidemic.176 
Beyond governmental neglect, examples of discrimination against gays and 
lesbians proliferated. Conservative writer William Buckley proposed that people 
with AIDS be tattooed so that others could easily avoid them.177 In 1985, 
Congressman William Dannemeyer (R-CA) proposed a series of bills that would 
make it a felony for any person with AIDS to give blood, deny federal funds to 
cities that did not close down gay bathhouses, and prohibit persons with AIDS 
from either working in the health care industry or attending public schools.178 
Even cosmopolitan cities like New York and San Francisco shuttered bath houses 
rather than focusing on education about safe sex.179 
Religious Right activists used the idea of sexual preference to justify anti-
gay bias. In testifying before Congress, Reverend Charles McIlhenny, a 
California-based anti-gay activist, argued that “homosexuality [was] not caused 
by a constitutional, glandular, hormonal, or genetic factor” but rather “a learned 
behavior.”180 If gays and lesbians made a voluntary choice, McIlhenny argued, 
they could not be true victims of discrimination. “Granting special legislation to 
a group because of behavior—let alone immoral behavior—opens the floodgates 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1983, at A6. 
 174.  For discussion of the theory that AIDS spread by casual contact, see, for example, Bob 
Nelson, “Casual Contact” Theories Incite AIDS Panic, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Jun. 18, 1983, at 3; 
Dudley Clendinen, AIDS Spreads Pain and Fear Among Ill and Healthy Alike, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 17, 1983 at 
A1; Larry Goldsmith, New Studies Further Speculation on AIDS, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, May 21, 1983, 
at 3.  
 175.  On the slow and incomplete federal response, see, for example, RIMMERMAN, supra note 123, 
at 89; DEBORAH B. GOULD, MOVING POLITICS: EMOTION AND ACT UP’S FIGHT AGAINST AIDS 92 (2009); 
RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 154, 324–30 
(2007). RE Note: I think the author cited to the Twentieth Anniversary Edition, hence I corrected the 
Staff Editors’ deletion here. 
 176.  On Reagan’s veto threat, see, for example, Bob Nelson, AIDS Funding Jeopardized by Veto 
Threat, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Jun. 25, 1983, at 3; Sue Hyde, Task Force to Meet with Presidential Aide, 
GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Jun. 18, 1983, at 1. 
 177.  See, e.g., William F. Buckley, Jr., Opinion and Editorial, Crucial Steps in Combating the AIDS 
Epidemic; Identify All Carriers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1986, at A27. 
 178.  On Dannemeyer’s proposals, see E. R. Shipp, Concern Over Sp[re]ad of AIDS Generates a Spate 
of New Laws Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1985, at 1; Marlene Cimons, AIDS Workplace Guidelines 
Win Praise But Dannemeyer Vows to Continue Fight to Restrict Victims’ Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1985, at 
6; Dannemeyer Outlines His View on AIDS, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1986, at 2 [hereinafter Dannemeyer 
Outlines His View].  
 179.  On the bathhouse regulations, see Marilyn Chase, Doctors’ Efforts to Control AIDS Spark 
Battles Over Civil Liberties, WALL ST.  J., Feb. 8, 1985, at 23; N.Y. Bans Sexual Activities Tied to AIDS 
Bathhouses, Other Establishments Face Closure for Violations, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1985, at 12; Kevin 
Roderick & Marlene Cimons, U.S., County Support Curbs on Bathhouses, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1985, at 
A1. 
 180.  Hearing on the Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1981 Before the Subcommittee on Employment 
Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 97th Cong. 32 (1982) (statement of Rev. 
Charles McIlhenny). 
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to any group that wants minority status,” he concluded.181 
At the national level, Religious Right figures echoed this reasoning. In 
opposing an amendment to the Civil Rights Act, Connie Marshner, a close ally of 
Weyrich’s, contended that privacy rights militated against protections for gays 
and lesbians.182 “What we are advocating,” she explained, “is that our right to 
privacy be respected: That the homosexual lifestyle not be flaunted in our 
neighborhoods and shouted from the housetops.”183 The opposition made 
sexual-preference arguments shorthand for the libertinism and selfishness of 
which Religious Right activists accused gay men.184 
The politics of AIDS reinforced social conservatives’ effort to equate 
selfishness and sexual preference. Judy Welton of Parents United Because 
Legislators Ignore Children (PUBLIC), a group that campaigned for the 
expulsion of infected children from public schools, argued against increased 
funding for research, public education, or drug trials related to AIDS.185 Framing 
sexuality as a mere preference, Welton argued that gay men and lesbians put 
their wellbeing above everyone else’s.186 “What kind of compassion,” she asked, 
“allows a disease such as AIDS to go on, knowing the causes are selfish, immoral 
behavior patterns that affect all of us?”187 
Dannemeyer, one of the most visible anti-gay leaders, happily discussed the 
idea of sexual preference.188 In response to accusations of bigotry, Dannemeyer 
wrote to the Los Angeles Times: “Whether the public health response to AIDS 
should be compromised because of the perceived sensitivities of the male 
homosexual community, or whether gay rights should be given ‘equal 
treatment,’ comes down to basic value choices in a free society.I speak for those 
who favor traditional family values.”189 
Leaders of the NGLTF responded that sexual-orientation discrimination, not 
sexual preference discrimination, was the real issue. Virginia Apuzzo, the new 
leader of NGLTF, described AIDS as a “public health crisis [that] has struck 
minorities who have traditionally been the victims of officially sanctioned 
discrimination.”190 As Jeff Levi, Apuzzo’s replacement at NGLTF, later 
explained: “Hiding behind a false mask of concern about public health, there 
have been efforts to use the fear of AIDS to oppose or repeal civil rights 
protections for gay men and lesbians.”191 NGLTF leaders also attributed 
 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  See id. at 40–41 (statement of Connaught Marshner). 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  See id. 
 185.  See AIDS Issues Part II: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 683–84 (1987) (statement of Patricia Welton).  
 186.  See id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  See Dannemeyer Outlines His View, supra note 178, at 5. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Federal Response to AIDS: Testimony before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and 
Human Resources of the House Committee on Governmental Relations, 98th Cong. 24 (1983)  (statement of 
Virginia Apuzzo). 
 191.  Federal and Local Government’s Response to the AIDS Epidemic: Testimony Before the 
Subcommittee on Intergovenmental Relations and Human Relations of the House Committee on Human 
Resources, 99th Cong.237–38  (1985) (statement of Jeff Levi). 
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governmental indifference to anti-gay bias. As Apuzzo stated, “The failure of 
government to recognize and deal with the health issues facing gays and lesbians 
is a reflection of the oppression we face in American society .”192 
Concerned about the advances of the Religious Right and blowback from 
the AIDS crisis, members of NGLTF and GRNL began defining sexuality as an 
unchangeable orientation rather than a matter of preference. In renewing the 
push for federal civil-rights legislation, GRNL created a public education 
campaign to “analyze barriers in public thinking to the enactment of effective 
public policy measures ending discrimination based on sexual orientation” and 
“[t]o educate the public on the nature of homosexuality.”193 Recognizing the 
downsides of sexual-preference arguments, members of the group planned to 
“counter” special-preference claims.194 To do so, GRNL almost exclusively used 
the language of orientation. “Our goal,” the group stated, “[is] equal justice 
under the law regardless of sexual orientation.”195 In testifying in favor of an 
amendment to Title VII, Jean O’Leary, then a member of GRNL, also insisted 
civil-rights protections were not “designed to approve a lifestyle or create a 
special minority—but simply to prohibit discrimination [. . .] based on sexual 
orientation.”196 
NGLTF also cast aside sexual-preference rhetoric. In lobbying inside and 
outside of Congress, the organization convinced the Mayors’ Conference to 
“[r]ecogniz[e] the right of all citizens, regardless of sexual orientation, to full 
participation in American society.”197 AIDS and the discrimination it unleashed 
bolstered arguments about sexual-orientation discrimination. As NGLTF argued 
in the period, “90% of lesbians and gay men have been victimized at some point 
in their lives solely because of their sexual orientation.”198 
C. Orientation, Suspect Classification, and the Courts 
As GLBTQ activists renewed the push for protection in the Supreme Court, 
 
 192.  Press Release, National Gay Task Force, Gay/Lesbian Community to Discuss Health Issues 
with Reagan Administration (June 12, 1983) (on file with author and the Cornell University Library). 
 193.  Press Release, Gay Rights National Lobby, Gay Rights National Lobby Creates Education 
and Research Foundation (Nov. 22, 1981) (on file with author and the Cornell University Library); see 
also Memorandum, Rick Davis, Education and Research Director, Right to Privacy Foundation, on 
Sharing Right to Privacy Goals and Objectives with leaders of other community organizations to 
Steve Endean, President, Right to Privacy Foundation 1–4 (1983) [hereinafter Davis to Endean] (on 
file with author and the Cornell University Library). 
 194.  Davis to Endean, supra note 193, at 2. 
 195.  Proposal, Gay Rights National Lobby, Grant Proposal to Playboy Foundation (Feb. 15, 1983) 
(on file with author and the Cornell University Library). 
 196.  Hearing on the Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1981 Before the Subcommittee on Employment 
Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 97th Cong. 8 (1982) (statement of Jean 
O’Leary). For more on the strategy behind amending the Civil Rights Act, see JOHN-MANUEL 
ANDRIOTE, VICTORY DEFERRED: HOW AIDS CHANGED GAY LIFE IN AMERICA 222 (1999); MARGOT 
CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 262 
(2009); CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 14, at 240–42, 258.   
 197.  “Mayors’ Conference Favors Gay and Lesbian Civil Rights” (Jan. 27, 1984) (on file with 
author and the Cornell University Library). 
 198.  Press Release, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, National Gay Task Force Position 
Statements on AIDS-Related Issues (Apr. 14, 1985) (on file with author and the Cornell University 
Library). 
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activists identified another reason for using the language of sexual orientation. 
As the movement explored arguments that sexual orientation was a suspect 
classification, it became more important to describe sexual identities and 
behaviors as unchangeable. The political and legal justifications for using the 
rhetoric of sexual orientation aligned. 
In the 1980s, when movement attorneys focused on a challenge to sodomy 
regulations, attorneys for organizations like NGLTF and Lambda often 
prioritized substantive due process arguments based on the right to privacy.199 
These arguments took center stage in Bowers v. Hardwick,200 when activists 
challenged the constitutionality of sodomy bans. Acting as amicus curiae, the 
National Lesbian Rights Project and allied groups argued: “[T]he right 
of privacy, as derived from the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, readily and 
reasonably includes the right of an adult person of whatever sexual orientation 
(to wit., [sic] whether heterosexual, bisexual, gay or lesbian) to choose to engage 
in physically private, consenting, non-violent sexual activities with another adult 
person.”201 Those challenging the law relied on cases like Roe v. Wade,202 arguing 
that the Court had mandated “heightened scrutiny not of state restrictions on 
procreative sex, but rather of restrictions on non-procreative sex—sex solely as a 
facet of associational intimacy—whether between married partners or between 
unmarried individuals.”203 In 1986, the Bowers Court flatly rejected these 
claims.204 The majority stated bluntly: “[T]o claim that a right to engage in 
[sodomy] is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”205 
When Bowers temporarily seemed to foreclose a privacy strategy, movement 
attorneys began experimenting more vigorously with alternatives.206 While 
continuing to push privacy arguments in state court, movement lawyers began 
putting more emphasis on claims that sexual orientation was a suspect 
classification, much like race.207 
These arguments gained attention in 1992, when the Supreme Court heard 
Romer v. Evans, a case involving the constitutionality of Colorado’s Amendment 
Two.208 That measure prohibited any local government from passing 
antidiscrimination protections for gays and lesbians.209 In its amicus brief, 
Human Rights Campaign (HRC), a major movement organization formed in the 
early 1980s, argued that the Court would not have to address whether sexual 
 
 199.  On the emphasis on privacy arguments, see, for example, MEZEY, supra note 86, at 230; 
ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE 
AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 32 (2009). 
 200.  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 201.  Brief Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project et al. at 3, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140). 
 202.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 203.  Brief for Respondent at 12, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140). 
 204.  See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–205. 
 205.  Id. at 194. 
 206.  On litigation strategy after Bowers, see, for example, ANDERSEN, supra note 199, at 120–26; 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 105, at 329–48, 422–57. 
 207.  See, e.g., RON BECKER, GAY TV AND STRAIGHT AMERICA 65–74 (2006). 
 208.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1992). 
 209.  COLO. CONST. art. II, §30, subsec. b. 
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orientation was suspect to strike down Amendment Two.210 However, the group 
maintained that sexual orientation should qualify as a suspect classification.211 
HRC recognized that the crucial problem was the requirement that a trait be 
immutable.212  The group insisted that immutable-trait analysis “revolves around 
the concept of ‘lack of responsibility’ and relates to the premise that it is unfair to 
penalize an individual for a characteristic over which the individual has had no 
responsibility in acquiring.”213 According to HRC, sexual orientation was just 
such a characteristic.214 
As many predicted, Romer did not conclude that sexual orientation was a 
suspect classification, but the Court still held that Amendment Two failed 
rational basis review and struck it down.215 After Romer, equal protection 
reasoning raised the stakes of proving sexual orientation to be a suspect 
classification. Indeed, when developing a new challenge to sodomy bans, some 
activists believed that the movement should focus exclusively on equality 
reasoning.216 Ultimately, in 2003, activists used both privacy and equality 
arguments in litigating Lawrence v. Texas.217 This strategy seemed to pay off when 
a majority struck down the Texas sodomy ban.218 Rhetorically, Lawrence invoked 
the ideas of both liberty and equality but left open questions about the precise 
doctrinal foundation and scope of the Court’s ruling.219 After Lawrence, 
demonstrating that sexual orientation was a suspect classification remained a 
movement priority.220 
At the same time that the outcome of equal-protection litigation seemed to 
depend on whether sexual orientation was immutable, popular support seemed 
to be influenced by the same considerations. Between 1977 and 2012, Gallup 
polls asked respondents both if they believed sexual orientation was immutable 
and if they favored equality for gays and lesbians.221 Roughly two-thirds of those 
 
 210.  See Brief of the Human Rights Campaign Fund et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 21, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Brief of the HRCF]. Other major 
movement groups concluded that the Court would not yet recognize sexual orientation as a suspect 
classification and did not press this claim; instead, organizations like the ACLU contended that 
Amendment 2 failed even rational basis review. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 105, at 282–84; 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 97 at 208. 
 211.  See Brief of the HRCF, supra note 210, at 21. 
 212.  See, e.g., id. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  See, e.g., id. 
 215.  See Romer, 517 U.S. at 628–36. 
 216.  See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 199, at 127. 
 217.  See, e.g., id. at 127–35. 
 218.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). 
 219.  On the connection between liberty and equality in Lawrence, see, for example, Laurence H. 
Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
1893, 1898 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1458–59 
(2004); Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 97–100 (2003); Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay 
Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 863 (2014) (“As many scholars have noted, Lawrence was a constitutional 
hybrid, drawing on both strands of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine.”). 
 220.  See ANDERSEN, supra note 199, at 127–35. 
 221.  See, e.g., JOHN R. HIBBING, KEVIN B. SMITH & JOHN R. ALFORD, PREDISPOSED: LIBERALS, 
CONSERVATIVES, AND THE BIOLOGY OF POLITICAL DIFFERENCES 253 (2014). 
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who believed that homosexuality was a lifestyle choice viewed gay lifestyles as 
unacceptable.222 By contrast, more than three-quarters of those who thought 
sexual orientation was immutable found gay lifestyles acceptable.223 
As marriage equality made its way into federal court, the use of clashing 
definitions of sexual orientation signaled deeper disagreement about the 
legitimacy of marriage equality. Whereas conservative groups continued to insist 
that homosexuality was an illegitimate preference, GLBTQ groups and their 
allies maintained that sexual orientation was immutable.224 In 2013-2014, GLBTQ 
litigators challenged the constitutionality of Proposition 8, a state constitutional 
ban on marriage equality, and the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), a 
law denying federal benefits and recognition to married same-sex couples. 
Liberty Counsel, a leading socially conservative public interest group, used 
sexual-preference arguments in defending same-sex marriage bans. 
Manipulating psychiatric evidence, the group stressed how much sexual identity 
could change.225 Because sexuality was chosen, Liberty Counsel argued,  sexual 
orientation could not be a suspect classification.226 “If homosexuality is properly 
understood as a behavior or lifestyle choice, and is well-recognized as fluid and 
developing,” the group argued, “then certainly it cannot be said to be 
immutable.”227 
A year later in Obergefell v.  Hodges, the American Psychological Association 
(APA) and other allied groups supporting marriage equality argued that 
homosexuality was “normal, generally not chosen, and [. . .] highly resistant to 
change.”228 GLMA, a gay-rights health advocacy group, agreed: “All credible 
study of sexual orientation establishes that genetic, hereditary and biological 
influences are major factors in determining sexual orientation.”229 So did leading 
constitutional scholars, who maintained that “[g]ay and lesbian individuals share 
a common ‘immutable’ characteristic, both because sexual orientation is 
fundamental to their identity, [. . .] and because one’s sexual orientation is not 
changeable through conscious decision, therapeutic intervention, or any other 
method.”230 By contrast, some socially conservative amici in Obergefell even 
refused to use the language of sexual orientation, referring to homosexuality as a 
“sexual preference.”231 
 
 222.  See, e.g., id. 
 223.  See, e.g., id. 
 224.  See infra Part II. 
 225.  See Brief of Amici Liberty Counsel, Inc. and Campaign for Children and Families in Support 
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562, 14-571, 14-574). 
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Petitioners at 9, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 
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The language of sexual orientation has become a cornerstone of progressive 
arguments for GLBTQ equality—a way of maximizing support for the cause and 
strengthening equal-protection arguments in the courts. By contrast, those 
skeptical of the GLBTQ movement draw on the language of sexual preference to 
challenge both legal and political demands for equal treatment. This political 
alignment now seems natural, but the politics and law of defining sexuality have 
changed significantly over time. In the 1970s, leading activists stayed away from 
the rhetoric of sexual orientation. Groups at the state and federal level argued 
that orientation-based definitions offered too little protection. Only after the 
AIDS epidemic and the rise of the Religious Right did arguments about sexual 
preference come to seem to be a staple of social conservatism advocacy.  By 
drawing on this history, Part III next evaluates the definition of sexuality at work 
in Obergefell itself. 
III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN OBERGEFELL 
Although Obergefell revolutionized access to marriage for gays and lesbians, 
Justice Kennedy’s majority says surprisingly little about sexual orientation. 
Nevertheless, a close reading of both the majority and dissents in Obergefell 
reveals that the Court increasingly treats orientation as clearly identifiable, 
binary, and unchangeable. 
Kennedy first discusses the nature of orientation in relating the history of 
gays and lesbians in the United States.232 In describing the rise of sodomy bans, 
Obergefell explains that other Americans did not “deem homosexuals to have 
dignity in their own distinct identity.”233 At a minimum, the Court suggests that 
sexual orientation is not simply a behavior or lifestyle but rather something more 
meaningful—a distinct identity.234 
Later, after describing the recent history of the GLBTQ movement, Obergefell 
describes clearer evidence of how the Court sees sexual orientation.235 “Only in 
more recent years,” Kennedy writes, “have psychiatrists and others recognized 
that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of human sexuality and 
immutable.”236 
Here, Obergefell’s definition of sexual orientation is revealing. Kennedy cites 
the American Psychological Association (APA)’s definition for support.237 In 
amicus briefs in both Windsor and Obergefell, the APA has described sexuality in 
the following terms: 
 
(“It is Amici's position that the government should never classify or discriminate against another 
human being based on who they are. A person’s sexuality and sexual preferences, however, 
are not their state of being, or even an immutable aspect of who they are, as race is. The truth is that 
sexual conduct is an activity.”); Amicus Curiae Brief of Leaders of the 2012 Republican National 
Convention Committee on the Platform and Others Supporting Respondents at 13, Obergefell, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).  
 232.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  See id. 
 235.  See id. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  See id. 
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Sexual orientation refers to an enduring disposition to experience sexual, 
affectional, and/or romantic attractions to one or both sexes. It also encompasses 
an individual’s sense of personal and social identity based on those attractions, 
on behaviors expressing those attractions, and on membership in a community of 
others who share those attractions and behaviors. Although sexual orientation 
ranges along a continuum from exclusively heterosexual to exclusively 
homosexual, it is usually discussed in three categories: heterosexual (having 
sexual and romantic attraction primarily or exclusively to members of the other 
sex), homosexual (having sexual and romantic attraction primarily or exclusively 
to members of one’s own sex), and bisexual (having a significant degree of sexual 
and romantic attraction to both sexes).238 
Kennedy partly echoes the APA’s description of sexuality. Obergefell 
highlights that sexuality is constitutive of individual identity.239 Like the APA, 
the Court’s opinion also presents homosexuality and bisexuality as normal.240 
However, the majority goes further than the APA in describing sexuality as 
immutable.241 The APA defines sexual orientation as enduring and highly 
resistant to change.242 However, the organization also emphasizes the diversity 
and fluidity of sexual identities, attractions, and relationships—something that 
drops out of Obergefell entirely.243 While the opinion is far from clear, the Court 
seems to have adopted fairly clean, bright-line binaries to describe sexuality. 
Obergefell describes sexual orientation as distinct and immutable but also 
largely irrelevant, at least to the question of marriage. While Kennedy borrows 
some of the APA’s language about gay and lesbian identity, Obergefell never 
hints at the existence of a distinctive culture or community. Instead, in every way 
that counts, the gay and lesbian couples described in the opinion resemble their 
heterosexual counterparts.244 For example, in analyzing a potential due process 
claim, Obergefell emphasizes the ways in which same-sex couples resemble 
opposite-sex couples.245 “The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring 
bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, 
intimacy, and spirituality,” the Court explains.246 “This is true for all persons, 
whatever their sexual orientation.”247 Whatever is distinctive about gays and 
lesbians, Kennedy makes clear that it has nothing to do with couples’ ability to 
raise loving families or legitimately desire marriage.248 
Obergefell leaves many questions unanswered. Kennedy does little to resolve 
the standard of scrutiny applied to sexual-orientation classifications.249 While 
Obergefell explicitly concludes that same-sex marriage bans in some way violate 
 
 238.  Brief of the APA, supra note 228, at 7–9 (emphasis in the original). 
 239.  Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596, with Brief of the APA, supra note 228, at 7–9. 
 240.  Supra note 239. 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. 
 245.  See, e.g., id. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id.  
 248.  See id at 2599–601 (“There is no difference between same- and opposite- sex couples with 
respect to this principle.”). 
 249.  See generally id. at 2596–601. 
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both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the decision provides no real 
map for lower courts dealing with sexual-orientation classifications.250 
Nevertheless, Obergefell suggests that same-sex couples resemble opposite sex 
couples in every salient way—indeed, in every way actually discussed by the 
majority. The Court also spotlights the harms of treating same-sex couples 
differently without reason. “Especially against a long history of disapproval of 
their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a 
grave and continuing harm,” Kennedy writes. “The imposition of this disability 
on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”251 
In spite of the ambiguity of Obergefell, the Court’s understanding of sexual 
orientation differs significantly from the ones used in Justice Roberts and Scalia’s 
dissents. Roberts frames his opinion as an attack on the overreach of the Court.252 
In describing the goals of same-sex couples, he strikes a more conciliatory note.253 
“If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual orientation—who 
favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision,” he 
writes.254 It might be telling that Roberts uses the language of sexual orientation, 
rather than sexual preference, in spite of the implicit invitation by some 
conservative amici to do so. 
At other times, however, Roberts at least implies that sexual orientation is 
something less than immutable. In criticizing the breadth of the Court’s opinion, 
Roberts notes that much of the logic of Obergefell could easily apply to 
polyamorous relationships.255 Roberts notes several possible themes uniting the 
interests of those in polyamorous and same-sex relationships: a desire to avoid 
harming children by denying their parents access to marriage, the constitutional 
importance of decisional autonomy, and the importance of dignifying alternative 
relationships.256 While acknowledging that there may be distinctions between 
same-sex couples and those in polyamorous relationships, Roberts does not say 
what the majority treats as obvious. For the majority, same-sex marriage differs 
from polyamorous unions because sexual orientation is immutable.257 
While an autonomy argument for marriage equality may apply effectively 
to polyamorous relationships, an equality argument seems harder to make at 
present. Few scholars have argued that the desire to be in a polyamorous 
relationship is immutable, although some evidence supports the idea that a 
preference for polyamory is at least partly biological.258 For the most part, 
 
 250.  See id. at 2602–05. 
 251.  Id. at 2604. 
 252.  See id. at 2616 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (describing the majority as “indefensible as a matter of 
constitutional law”). 
 253.  See id. at 2626. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  See id. at 2622 (“If not having the opportunity to marry ‘serves to disrespect and 
subordinate’ gay and lesbian couples, why wouldn't the same ‘imposition of this disability’ . . . serve 
to disrespect and subordinate people who find fulfillment in polyamorous relationships?”). 
 256.  See id. 
 257.  See id. 
 258.  See, e.g., Ann Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U CIN. L. REV. 1461, 1484 (2011) 
(summarizing leading views of polyamorous preferences); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: 
Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 343–45 (2004) 
(same). 
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contemporary debate treats polyamory as a mere lifestyle preference.259 
Comparing polyamorous relationships to those of gay and lesbian couples at 
least raises the question of whether Roberts sees sexual orientation as a mere 
matter of choice. 
Justice Antonin Scalia also described sexuality in ambiguous terms. Like 
Roberts, Scalia trained his fire on the majority and its willingness, in his view, to 
impose the views of the Court on the public.260 When discussing sexuality itself, 
Scalia studiously avoided the language used by the same-sex couples and their 
attorneys.261 He wrote dismissively: “The law can recognize as marriage 
whatever sexual attachments and living arrangements it wishes.”262 For Scalia, 
sexuality might not rise to the level of an orientation that cannot be changed.263 
Instead, gays and lesbians have only one of several possible “sexual 
attachments” that the law could recognize.264 
The clues in each opinion notwithstanding, Obergefell leaves many questions 
unanswered. The majority avoided announcing a standard of scrutiny or 
deeming sexual orientation a suspect classification. Partly for this reason, 
litigation of sexual-orientation classifications will likely follow closely after the 
Court’s decision. Some of these lawsuits will stem directly from Obergefell itself. 
Even the majority foreshadowed the likely suits brought by vendors and other 
public accommodations wishing to deny service to same-sex couples or GLBTQ 
individuals for reasons of religion or conscience.265 Other suits will likely force 
the Court to clarify whether sexual-orientation classifications do in fact warrant 
strict scrutiny. 
This litigation will require the courts to develop a sharper definition of 
sexual orientation. Other scholars have recognized that courts often treat 
sexuality as a binary—and with deeply problematic results.266 The history of the 
framing of sexuality illuminates some underappreciated costs of this binary. 
Drawing on the risks recognized by movement members in the 1970s, Part IV 
begins by analyzing these costs. Next, Part IV develops an alternative to reduce 
these costs. 
IV. PERCEIVED SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
Although the Court’s analysis on the issue is far from lucid, the Obergefell 
majority seems to describe sexual orientation by reference to immutable, fixed 
categories. Nevertheless, after Obergefell, the lower courts will have not only to 
clarify the standard of review for sexual-orientation discrimination but also to 
plainly define sexual orientation itself. Obergefell included, existing precedent 
 
 259.  See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 260.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628–31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 261.  See id. at 2626–27. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  See id. 
 264.  See id. 
 265.  See id. at 2607 (“[I]t must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious 
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-
sex marriage should not be condoned.”). 
 266.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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offers no such clear definition. In federal court, this should be no surprise. The 
federal courts have not yet established that sexual orientation is a suspect 
classification.267 Nor does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 treat sexual 
orientation as a protected class.268 By contrast, the state and city-level protections 
that first appeared in the 1970s offer some idea of how lawmakers have defined 
sexual orientation. 
When viewed in historical perspective, these laws shed some light on the 
problems with the kind of bright-line definition the Court seems to have 
adopted. The first set of problems involves the conduct-status distinction. On one 
hand, as activists experienced in the past, protecting a supposedly immutable 
status may open the door to justifications for conduct-based discrimination. This 
possibility seems very real in the context of public accommodations 
discrimination for same-sex couples. 
Consider the example of Elane Photography v. Willock. In that case, a 
photographer challenged a recent New Mexico statute that banned 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in state court.269 The New 
Mexico law defined sexual orientation as “heterosexuality, homosexuality or 
bisexuality, whether actual or perceived.”270  The proprietors of Elane 
Photography argued, among other things, that the law violated the Free Exercise 
Clause.271 As a threshold matter, however, the proprietors argued that they had 
not violated the statute at all.272 The owners of Elane Photography claimed that 
they objected not to the sexual orientation of same-sex couples but rather to their 
conduct—celebrating marriages that ran contrary to the religious beliefs of the 
proprietors.273 The owners also maintained that they would refuse to photograph 
heterosexual couples endorsing same-sex marriage.274 
Ultimately, the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected this argument, but the 
lengths the court went to do so makes clear how difficult the status-conduct 
distinction might be to overcome in the future. The court identified three reasons 
for refusing a distinction between conduct and status. First, the court reasoned: 
“The difficulty in distinguishing between status and conduct in the context of 
sexual orientation discrimination is that people may base their judgment about 
an individual’s sexual orientation on the individual’s conduct.”275 
Here, the court compared its case to Lawrence v. Texas, a Supreme Court 
decision striking down sodomy bans.276 The Lawrence Court rejected a conduct-
 
 267.  See, e.g., Herbert C. Brown, Jr., A Crowded Room or the Perfect Fit? Exploring Affirmative Action 
Treatment in College and University Admissions for Self-Identified LGBT Individuals, 21 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 603, 640–50 (2015) (detailing how the courts have stopped short of recognizing sexual 
orientation as a suspect classification). 
 268.  See, e.g., Stephanie Rotondo, Employment Discrimination Against LGBT Persons, 16 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 103, 112–14 (2015). 
 269.  See Elane Photography L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 58–59 (N.M. 2013). 
 270.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(P) (West 2007).  
 271.  See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 63. 
 272.  See id. at 61–62. 
 273.  See id. 
 274.  See id. 
 275.  Id. at 61. 
 276.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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status distinction with respect to sodomy bans.277 For the Elane Photography 
Court, the connection between status and conduct seemed just as close.278 To 
other judges, this may not be obvious. Entering into, appearing to enter into, or 
endorsing same-sex marriage bears a much less close relationship to sexual 
orientation than would same-sex sexual conduct itself. As the court recognized in 
Elane Photography, the New Mexico statute was written in extremely broad 
terms.279 A narrower statute may make the conduct-status distinction harder to 
overcome. 
Second, Elane Photography stressed that the proprietors refused to 
photograph any displays of affection between same-sex couples.280 As the court 
recognized, the connection between sexual orientation and conduct at issue in 
the case was particularly close.281 The proprietors seemed willing to offer services 
to GLBTQ customers only so long as they concealed their sexual orientation.282 If 
Elane Photography had narrowed its objections—say to photographs of same-sex 
marriages—the connection between conduct and status might have been far less 
close, and the proprietors’ arguments might have been more compelling. 
The history of framing sexuality illuminates another danger tied to the 
conduct-status distinction. If a law protects individuals on the basis of actual 
status, plaintiffs often struggle to prove that the discriminating party knew of 
their orientation. Consider the example of Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera.283 There, 
plaintiff, a heterosexual female, began working at the Metropolitan Opera as a 
secretary.284 She later moved up in the ranks, becoming an assistant director. She 
eventually began working under David Kneuss, a gay man.285 Not long after her 
tenure began, however, Brennan was fired, and she believed she had been 
targeted because of her sexual orientation.286 She brought suit under a New York 
law outlawing sexual-orientation discrimination.287 As part of her case, Brennan 
pointed out that RG, whom she identified as a gay man, had been hired to 
replace her.288 
The Brennan Court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff could not make 
out the elements of her prima facie case because she could not prove that Kneuss 
knew either that Brennan was straight or that RG was gay.289 Identifying sexual 
orientation might not be a problem in cases like Elane Photography involving 
 
 277.  Id. at 575 (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that 
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 278.  See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 62–63. 
 279.  See id. at 61. 
 280.  See id. (stating that the owners “testified that they would also have refused to take photos of 
same-sex couples in other contexts, including photos of a couple holding hands or showing affection 
for each other.”). 
 281.  See id. 
 282.  See id. 
 283.  Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass’n 192 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 284.  See id. at 313–16. 
 285.  See id. 
 286.  See id. 
 287.  See id. 
 288.  See id. 
 289.  See id. at 317–18. 
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displays of commitment or affection. In other settings, like employment, 
recognizing sexual orientation may be problematic. This would be especially 
tricky in cases involving those with fluid identities, like bisexuals and others who 
do not see their orientation as fixed over time. 
The history of framing sexuality highlights the problems involved not only 
in proving “authentic” sexuality but also the probability of orientation-based 
stereotyping. Because individual sexuality does not conform to the limited, 
clearly defined categories often embraced by courts, individuals may face 
discrimination because of their perceived, rather than actual, identity. Much as 
the courts do, many individuals assume those around them are either gay or 
straight. This categorization may affect those who do not fit into the neat binary, 
as well as misidentify non-gender conforming individuals. People make 
judgments about sexual orientation based on a variety of cues, including body 
motion, dress and hairstyle, behavior, and relationship status, and some of these 
judgments are inaccurate.290 As a result, discriminators victimize some 
individuals not because of sexual conduct or identity but because of the 
stereotypes surrounding sexual orientation. 
Washington state law illustrates the problem with false positives of this 
kind. In Davis v. Fred’s Appliance, the plaintiff worked as a delivery truck driver 
for a Spokane appliance store.291 Although the plaintiff identified as a 
heterosexual, a local store supervisor began repeatedly calling plaintiff “Big Gay 
Al,” a prominent gay television character.292 The supervisor knew nothing of 
plaintiff’s personal life but appeared to react to plaintiff’s personality and 
appearance.293 Plaintiff repeatedly asked the supervisor to stop, but when he 
persisted, plaintiff exploded and was ultimately terminated.294 
Washington law banned discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
defined as “heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and gender expression 
or identity.”295 The law further defined gender expression as “having or being 
perceived as having a gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or 
expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance, 
behavior, or expression is different from that traditionally associated with the sex 
assigned to that person at birth.”296 Plaintiff argued that the law protected 
against discrimination on the basis of real and perceived sexual orientation.297 
The court rejected this argument.298 Because the statute specifically mentioned 
perceived identity with respect to gender identity, the court reasoned that the 
omission of perceived sexual orientation was deliberate, and plaintiff’s claim 
failed.299 
False positives like those in Fred’s Appliance seem likely to impact a broad 
 
 290.  See infra Part IV. 
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group of people. Those affected by sex stereotyping might be targeted because of 
sexual-orientation stereotyping. So too might those who do not identify with one 
of the clean categories adopted in statutes and by the courts. 
A. Toward a Solution 
Other scholars have recognized some of these problems and responded 
with new approaches to defining sexual orientation. Commentators like Kenji 
Yoshino, Naomi Mezey, Ruth Colker, and Elizabeth Glazer have all criticized the 
gay-straight binary many use to describe sexuality.300 Yoshino criticizes the 
neglect of bisexuality and develops his own analysis of it.301 He defines 
bisexuality by reference to desire, conduct, and self-identification.302 For Yoshino, 
bisexuals experience discrimination partly because law, politics, and culture have 
erased them from the conversation.303 By developing a more robust definition of 
bisexuality and foregrounding the issue of bisexual erasure, Yoshino suggests 
fundamental changes to existing doctrine, particularly in the area of sexual 
harassment.304 More radically, he proposes that “bisexuality’s destabilizing force 
may be a powerful means of contesting” the authority of government to regulate 
sexuality.305 
Rather than developing a new category, Naomi Mezey emphasizes the 
downsides of status-based definitions of sexual orientation.306 She argues that 
“the social and rhetorical categories of heterosexual and homosexual fail even 
remotely to approximate the actual range of human sexual activity, let alone 
human sexual desire.”307 Moreover, she argues that status-based categories have 
become “definitionally and doctrinally incoherent.”308 As an alternative, Mezey 
argues for protections based primarily on sexual behavior—protections that she 
believes would more accurately reflect human sexuality and offer help to a 
broader group.309 Mezey rejects any solution based on the creation of a new 
category insofar as “bisexuality works no better than the other two categories in 
accurately describing concrete sexual behavior, and that a new conceptualization 
of sexual identities, such as one based on acts, is needed.”310 
By contrast, Ruth Colker contends that the problem lies not in the existence 
of categories but in their current application.311 Colker urges the adoption of a 
third, “bi” category that “reject[s] conventional bipolar categories in the areas of 
 
 300.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text.   
 301.  See generally Yoshino, supra note 4. 
 302.  See id.at 371–77, 380–85.  
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gender, race, and disability.”312 She focuses on the unique harms tied to binaries 
rather than to categories.313 Binary thinking not only renders invisible but also 
stigmatizes those with more fluid identities.314 Nonetheless, Colker argues for the 
creation of a new category that would “broaden people’s understanding of 
identity” and facilitate the introduction of civil-rights protections.315 “We have to 
define who is ‘gay, lesbian or bisexual,’” Colker writes, “if we are to create 
nondiscrimination statutes, same-sex partner registration, or affirmative 
action.”316 
More recently, Elizabeth Glazer has proposed a different solution. Glazer 
breaks sexual orientation down into two sub-categories, general and specific 
orientation.317 General orientation describes “the sex toward which the 
individual is attracted as a general matter.”318 Specific orientation involves “the 
sex of the individual’s chosen partner.”319 In many cases the two orientations are 
identical, but for many bisexuals, the two differ.320 
To explain how her approach would work, Glazer draws an analogy to the 
sex-stereotyping theory derived from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a case holding 
that plaintiffs could prove sex discrimination under Title VII when they were 
victimized by sex stereotyping.321 Glazer argues that the law can protect 
orientation nonconformity much as it protects gender nonconformity under Price 
Waterhouse.322 Glazer’s approach would prohibit discrimination against an 
individual because her specific orientation differs from her general orientation.323 
She predicts that doing so will offer several advantages not available 
through other efforts to redefine sexuality.324 First, Glazer emphasizes the 
necessity of naming.325 While other scholars focus on the downsides of 
categorization, Glazer contends that “naming is the first step toward making 
visible those who are not, and making people visible is arguably the first step in 
securing for them civil rights.”326 Second, Glazer argues that because binary 
definitions of sexual orientation are so entrenched, focusing on orientation 
nonconformity will be more effective than strategies dependent on undermining 
established categories.327 Finally, Glazer hopes that her illumination of specific 
orientation will better reflect the lived experience of those with fluid identities 
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and behaviors.328 
Each approach acknowledges the inaccuracy of binary categories and adds a 
new dimension to existing ideas about sexual orientation. Drawing on the history 
of debates about sexuality, this Article advocates for a different approach—one 
that would protect against discrimination on the basis of perceived or actual 
sexual orientation. The laws of some states and localities already include such 
protections, and they deserve serious consideration elsewhere. 
Like Glazer or Mezey’s proposals, a perceived-identity approach will not 
easily fall prey to the conduct-status distinction. Glazer notes that by recognizing 
general and specific orientation, the law would make it harder for those like the 
owners of Elane Photography to justify conduct-based discrimination. So too 
would a perceived-orientation approach. Conduct seems to be one of the major 
reasons an individual would face perceived-orientation discrimination. Recall 
the men holding hands in the Minnesota bar mentioned by Bruce Voeller in the 
1970s. By separating status and conduct, local officials claimed the authority to 
target people on the basis of conduct. A perceived-orientation approach would 
prevent this. Discriminators would likely target the men Voeller described 
because they were perceived to be gay. By including hypothetical, as well as 
actual identity, perceived-identity strategies would protect those singled out 
because of their conduct. 
Weaving this support into common law and constitutional jurisprudence 
offers unique advantages. Perceived-identity approaches are already familiar to 
many judges under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).329 The 
ADA defines a disability as: (1) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities; (2) a record of such an 
impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.330 The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has set out several ways to prove 
that an individual is regarded as disabled.331 First, a defendant may regard an 
individual as disabled if she has a real impairment that does not substantially 
limit her ability to function so long as the defendant believes the impairment to 
be substantially limiting.332 Second, someone may be regarded as disabled when 
her condition is limiting only because of the fears surrounding it.333 Finally, an 
individual may be regarded as disabled even if she has no impairment 
whatsoever so long as the defendant does not believe that to be the case.334 
The logic of regarded-as approaches would easily extend to sexual 
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orientation. In some states, perceived-as approaches already apply.335 Elsewhere, 
courts interpreting state and federal disability laws are already familiar with 
regarded-as approaches.336 Importing similar reasoning into sexual-orientation 
law will require less of judges than the recognition of a new sexual-orientation 
category. 
Moreover, a perceived-identity approach can work without requiring 
judges and policymakers to cast aside established ideas about sexuality. 
Perceived-identity approaches like the ones at work in New Mexico assume that 
some persons, or even many, fall into the conventional gay or straight 
paradigm.337 These categories resonate deeply, even with those aware of their 
shortcomings.338 Statutes focused on perceived discrimination do not require 
legislators or judges to think beyond the gay-straight binary. Indeed, by focusing 
on perception, such an approach recognizes that discriminators will often 
mistakenly identify a victim as either gay or straight. Perceived-identity 
approaches recognize this reality while acknowledging that individual 
experience can be far more fluid. 
At least under certain circumstances, a perceived-orientation approach also 
seems likely to offer more protection than the strategies described by Glazer, 
Yoshino, Mezey, and Colker. Colker and Yoshino develop bisexual categories 
that protect those whose desires deviate from the heterosexual-homosexual 
paradigm.339 Mezey prefers to protect anyone whose conduct triggers 
discrimination.340 Finally, Glazer sets out two dimensions of identity and uses 
them to protect those singled out for orientation nonconformity.341 
All of these approaches promise some protection to those who do not fit the 
gay-straight binary. However, each leaves out some of those about whom 
activists worried during the 1970s. First, by offering protection on the basis of 
some combination of conduct, self-identification, and desire, no approach 
explicitly addresses orientation-based stereotypes. Individuals like the delivery 
driver in Fred’s Appliance suffer on the job not because of their lived sexual 
experience but rather because of orientation stereotyping. As the federal courts 
have recognized in the Title VII context, discriminators often conflate sexual-
orientation and sex stereotyping.342 Perceived-orientation approaches recognize 
 
 335.  See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 28-1-1 to -13 (West 1978); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107. 
 336.  See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -13 (West 1978) (defining sexual orientation as 
“heterosexual, bisexual, or homosexual”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-2 (West 1953) (defining sexual 
orientation as “an individual’s actual or perceived orientation as heterosexual, homosexual, or 
bisexual”). 
 337.  See supra notes 329–30 and text accompanying. 
 338.  See, e.g., COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 4, at xiii (“[C]ategorization under the law . . . is 
inevitable.”); Yoshino, supra note 4, at 391, 461 (“[B]isexuals remain invisible because both self-
identified straights and self-identified gays have overlapping political interests in bisexual erasure.”); 
Glazer, supra note 4, at 1064 (“Our current vocabulary cannot save even the most well-intentioned 
individual from the trap of the heterosexual/homosexual binary.”).  
 339.  See, e.g., COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 4, at 15, 86; Yoshino, supra note 4, at 459–61. 
 340.  See, e.g., Mezey, supra note 4, at 126–32. 
 341.  See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 4, at 1059–68. 
 342.  See, e.g., Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L. 
REV. 715, 764 (2014) (analyzing cases to show that “[p]laintiffs who ‘look gay’ succeed under Title VII 
while those merely known or thought to be gay do not”); Rotondo, supra note 268, at 107 (“LGBT 
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this reality and offer a potential solution to it. 
It is worth exploring why an approach that focuses partly on sexual 
conduct, like Mezey or Glazer’s, would not capture all of the discrimination 
covered by a perceived-orientation approach. As Mezey and Glazer envision, 
individuals deserve protection from discrimination based partly on specific 
sexual relationships—not just their general preference for one group of 
individuals or another. Mezey highlights the importance of stigma associated not 
only with “erotic and sexual desires [but] also about sexual acts.”343 For victims 
like those in Fred’s Appliance, however, the problem is not sexual conduct. 
Instead, in these cases, discriminators fall back on generalizations about the 
mannerisms, dress, appearance, or behavior associated with a specific sexual 
orientation. Often correlated with gender nonconformity, these stereotypes do 
not always track an individual’s romantic or sexual behavior, either in public or 
in private. 
Nor would Glazer’s protection of specific orientation necessarily reach 
plaintiffs like those in Fred’s Appliance. Glazer separates general orientation—an 
individual’s typical preference or type—from specific orientation, an individual’s 
desire for or relationship with a particular partner.344 As Glazer explains, some 
individuals face discrimination not because of their general orientation but 
because of incidents tied to their specific orientation. As she explains, “bisexual 
discrimination can be understood as discrimination on the basis of an 
individual’s conduct (for example, sleeping with a member of the same sex) 
failing to conform to an individual’s status (for example, heterosexual).”345 
Glazer would outlaw discrimination against those who sexual conduct deviates 
from their general orientation or identity.346 
Like Mezey’s strategy, Glazer’s method would protect the sexual behavior 
of those who do not fit comfortably within the standard categories used to define 
sexual orientation. However, like Mezey, Glazer also focuses on discrimination 
based partly on sexual conduct. As Voeller and his colleagues understood in the 
1970s, orientation-based discrimination often involves biases triggered not by 
sexual behavior but rather by what an individual does in public. Displays of 
affection may trigger orientation-based stereotyping, but so too may a variety of 
more subtle cues, including a plaintiff’s lack of a known same-sex significant 
other347 or gender non-conformity.348 Sexual-orientation discrimination harms 
 
plaintiffs have found success by building upon the sex stereotyping theories of discrimination 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.”).  
 343.  Mezey, supra note 4, at 126. 
 344.  See Glazer, supra note 4, at 1054–58.  
 345.  Id. at 1057. 
 346.  See id. at 1055–59. 
 347.  Several same-sex sexual harassment cases involve individuals targeted for not taking of 
advantage of sexual opportunities with opposite sex partners. See, e.g., Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. 
Supp. 1452, 1452–56 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (involving discriminator targeting plaintiff because of his lack of a 
wife or girlfriend); Mowery v. Escambia Cty. Util. Auth., 2006 WL 327965, at *4 (N.D. Fl. 2006) 
(involving discriminators stereotyping victim because of his age, economic status, and lack of an 
opposite-sex partner); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (involving 
plaintiff who was targeted because he did not have sex with a female friend). 
 348.  See, e.g., Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874 (describing harassment plaintiff suffered because he carried 
a tray “like a woman”); Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 568, 576–77 (7th Cir. 
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victims for reasons unrelated to private sexual behavior, and a perceived-
orientation approach promises to remedy some of these injuries. 
Scholars who seek to create a new bisexual category face different problems. 
Yoshino and Colker each define bisexuality in compelling ways. However, 
neither addresses how a plaintiff would prove her actual orientation. The 
example of Title VII litigation helps to illustrate this point. Under Title VII, to 
prove a disparate treatment claim based on actual orientation, a victim would 
have to establish first that she belonged to a protected class.349 For individuals 
whose conduct does not fit within classic, binary categories of sexual orientation, 
this requirement may prove fatal to a claim. 
In either a direct or indirect disparate treatment claim, plaintiffs may also 
have difficulty finding circumstantial evidence to establish that the employer 
acted because of their orientation. In direct disparate treatment cases, a plaintiff 
may prevail if she establishes direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination, 
including evidence that those not in the protected class systematically received 
better treatment or that plaintiff lost an opportunity to someone not in the 
protected class.350 In indirect disparate treatment cases, after the plaintiff makes 
out a prima facie case, she can rebut the employer’s legitimate non-
discriminatory justification using statistical evidence, direct evidence of 
discrimination, or proof that an individual outside of the protected class but 
otherwise similar to the plaintiff received better treatment.351 
In either direct or indirect cases, evidence of this kind may be as hard to 
come by as it was for the plaintiff in Brennan. Unlike race or sex, sexual 
orientation is not always visible or publicly known.352 Plaintiffs may struggle to 
prove, as in Brennan, that a discriminator knew of their true orientation, 
particularly when a victim does not fit within the gay-straight binary. Nor, given 
that sexual conduct and identity are often kept private, will plaintiffs easily 
identify comparators or compile statistical evidence. If the law reached perceived 
discrimination, plaintiffs would be relieved of the burden of proving the real 
orientation of potential comparators or the employer’s larger workforce. 
Moreover, new categories may not effectively protect those victimized by 
orientation stereotyping. Symbolically, protecting only “true” orientation sends 
the message that negative stereotypes tied to particular behaviors or identities 
are not deeply problematic in and of themselves. Perceived-orientation 
approaches help ameliorate this concern by asking courts to focus on what 
discriminators believe rather than to which category an individual belongs. 
 
1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998) (describing harassment plaintiff suffered because he wore an 
earring and did not conform to gender expectations).  
 349.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Frisco Indep. Sch. Dist., 789 F.3d 589, 597 (5th Cir. 2015).  
 350.  See, e.g., Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994); Marshall v. Am. 
Hosp. Ass’n., 157 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 351.  See, e.g., Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 558 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 977 (1987); BARBARA T. LINDEMANN , PAUL GROSSMAN & PAUL W. CANE,  EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 27 (3d ed. 1996). 
 352.  See, e.g., Definition of Terms, BERKELEY GENDER EQUITY RESEARCH CENTER, 
http://geneq.berkeley.edu/lgbt_resources_definiton_of_terms#invisible_minority (last visited Feb. 
18, 2016) (defining an “invisible minority” as a “group whose minority status is not always 
immediately visible, such as some disabled people and LGBTIQ people”). 
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Finally, perceived-orientation approaches allow for additional protection 
without adding another category. Scholars have documented the problems with 
sexual-orientation categories. Quite simply, such categories often leave a group 
of people without protection, much as the gay-straight binary left out many with 
more fluid identities. A perceived-orientation approach avoids the exclusion 
inevitably involved in categorization. 
To be sure, a perceived-orientation approach will not solve every problem 
tied to sexual-identity discrimination jurisprudence. As Title VII and ADA 
jurisprudence makes clear, plaintiffs often struggle to prove the intent of a 
discriminator in taking a particular act.353  A perceived-orientation approach 
would require victims to offer some proof of what a discriminator is thinking, 
and this will often prove to be no easy task. At the same time, an approach 
focused on perceived orientation captures the reality that individuals face 
orientation-based discrimination for a variety of reasons, including but not 
limited to conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
To the extent Obergefell defines sexual orientation, the Court has divided 
along conventional political lines. By defining sexual orientation as normal and 
immutable, the majority echoes the position taken by GLBTQ groups. To the 
extent that Justice Roberts and Scalia cast doubt on the immutability of sexual 
orientation, their dissents took up ideas used by religious conservatives and 
other opponents of same-sex marriage. 
As Obergefell exemplifies, the contemporary politics of orientation have 
become so familiar that they seem inevitable. History shows instead that the 
current alignment is recent—the product of several decades of political and 
social change. In the mid-1970s, as psychiatrists stopped defining homosexuality 
as an illness, mental-health professionals and GLBTQ activists debated how 
sexuality should be redefined. Within local, state, and national organizations, the 
issue divided activists. While some preferred the language of sexual orientation 
and effectively advocated for civil-rights ordinances that used that rhetoric, most 
movement leaders ultimately settled on the definition proposed by Jack Baker 
and his allies in Minnesota—one based on sexual or affectional preference. 
A preference-based definition gained support for both practical and 
ideological reasons. As a matter of principle, lesbian feminists favored language 
that expressed faith in the legitimacy of homosexuality and pride in GLBTQ 
identity. As a practical matter, movement leaders believed that preference-based 
definitions would offer more protection, particularly for those targeted because 
of conduct and orientation stereotyping. 
Later, when preference-based definitions lost influence, movement leaders 
responded to a hostile new political climate. As the Religious Right and New 
Right mobilized, conservative evangelicals refined arguments describing 
sexuality as a preference. At first, such arguments served primarily to undermine 
 
 353.  See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of 
Summary Judgment in Title VII and the ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 215 (1993) (“[U]nder the 
disparate treatment theory must prove that the defendant intended to discriminate, and intent is 
generally difficult to prove absent a smoking gun.”) (emphasis in the original). 
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demands for civil-rights protections. If homosexuality was nothing more than a 
preference, as the argument went, then creating civil-rights protections would 
represent an unfair form of special treatment for GLBTQ individuals. After the 
start of the AIDS epidemic, preference arguments also exploited public fear of 
the disease. 
As preference-based definitions became a political liability, groups like the 
NGLTF and GRNL stopped emphasizing them. By the 1990s, the language of 
sexual orientation had become legally as well as politically advantageous. When 
Bowers seemingly foreclosed privacy arguments, movement attorneys channeled 
more energy into equal-protection strategies, gradually building the case that 
sexual orientation was a suspect classification. This history is relevant to the 
challenge courts face in defining sexual orientation. Any solution deserving 
support should address all of the problems identified during the debates of the 
1970s. 
This Article proposed a perceived-orientation approach as a way of 
resolving some of the issues raised by activists in the 1970s. Laws that reach 
perceived orientation should guard against discrimination on the basis of 
conduct rather than status. Such an approach would protect those with fluid 
identities without requiring the courts to adopt a novel jurisprudential approach 
or think beyond an ingrained gay-straight binary. Moreover, perceived-identity 
laws would provide crucial protection for those victimized by orientation-based 
stereotyping. Re-conceptualizing sexual orientation would thus offer a valuable 
opportunity for courts and legislatures to explore the ways in which sexual-
orientation discrimination, like sex discrimination, harms not only outsider 
groups but also the larger community. 
 
